Does hazardous water matter? : evidence from the housing market and the Superfund program by Greenstone, Michael & Gallagher, Justin
Does Hazardous Waste Matter?
Evidence from the Housing Market and the Superfund
Program
by
06-020 September 2006
Michael Greenstone and Justin Gallagher
 
 
 
 
 
 
Does Hazardous Waste Matter?  
Evidence from the Housing Market and the Superfund Program* 
 
 
 
 
Michael Greenstone and Justin Gallagher 
 
September 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* We thank Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, Maureen Cropper, Esther Duflo, Dick Eckhaus, Alex Farrell, 
Don Fullerton, Jon Gruber, Jon Guryan, Joe Gyourko, Paul Joskow, Matthew Kahn, David Lee, Jim 
Poterba, Katherine Probst, Bernard Salanie, Randall Walsh, Rob Williams, Catherine Wolfram, and 
especially Ted Gayer for insightful comments.  The paper also benefited from the comments of seminar 
participants at ASSA, BYU, UC-Berkeley, UC-Davis, UC-Santa Barbara, CEMFI, Colorado, Columbia, 
HEC Montreal, Kentucky, LSE, MIT, NBER, Rand, Resources for the Future, SITE, Stanford, Syracuse, 
Texas, and UCLA.  Elizabeth Greenwood provided truly outstanding research assistance.  We also thank 
Leila Agha, Brian Goodness, Rose Kontak, William Li, and Jonathan Ursprung for exemplary research 
assistance.  We especially thank Katherine Probst for generously sharing data on the costs of Superfund 
clean-ups.  Funding from the Center for Integrating Statistical and Environmental Science at the 
University of Chicago and the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research at MIT is gratefully 
acknowledged.   
Does Hazardous Waste Matter?  
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Abstract 
 
This paper uses the housing market to develop estimates of the local welfare impacts of Superfund 
sponsored clean-ups of hazardous waste sites.  We show that if consumers value the clean-ups, then the 
hedonic model predicts that they will lead to increases in local housing prices and new home construction, 
as well as the migration of individuals that place a high value on environmental quality to the areas near 
the improved sites.  We compare housing market outcomes in the areas surrounding the first 400 
hazardous waste sites chosen for Superfund clean-ups to the areas surrounding the 290 sites that narrowly 
missed qualifying for these clean-ups.  We find that Superfund clean-ups are associated with 
economically small and statistically indistinguishable from zero local changes in residential property 
values, property rental rates, housing supply, total population, and the types of individuals living near the 
sites.  These findings are robust to a series of specification checks, including the application of a quasi-
experimental regression discontinuity design based on knowledge of the selection rule.  Overall, the 
preferred estimates suggest that the local benefits of Superfund clean-ups are small and appear to be 
substantially lower than the $43 million mean cost of Superfund clean-ups. 
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Introduction 
 The estimation of individuals’ valuations of environmental amenities with revealed preference 
methods has been an active area of research for more than three decades.  There are now theoretical 
models outlining revealed preference methods to recover economically well defined measures of 
willingness in a variety of settings, including housing markets, recreational choices, health outcomes, and 
the consumption of goods designed to protect individuals against adverse environmentally-induced 
outcomes (Freeman 2003 and Champ, Boyle, and Brown 2003 contain reviews).  The application of these 
approaches, however, is often accompanied by seemingly valid concerns about misspecification that 
undermine the credibility of any findings.  Consequently, many are skeptical that markets can be used to 
determine individuals’ valuations of environmental amenities.1   
 Hazardous waste sites are an example of an environmental disamenity that provokes great public 
concern.  The 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, which 
became known as Superfund, gave the EPA the right to place sites that pose an imminent and substantial 
danger to public welfare and the environment on the National Priorities List (NPL) and to initiate 
remedial clean-ups at those sites.  Through 2005, approximately $35 billion (2005$) in federal monies 
and an unknown amount of private funding has been spent on Superfund clean-ups, and yet remediations 
are incomplete at roughly half of the nearly 1,600 sites.2  The combination of these high costs and the 
absence of convincing evidence of its benefits has made Superfund a controversial program (EPA 2006). 
This paper uses the housing market to estimate the welfare consequences of Superfund sponsored 
clean-ups of hazardous waste sites.  The empirical challenge is that the evolution of housing prices 
proximate to the Superfund sites in the absence of the clean-ups is unknown.  The development of a valid 
counterfactual is likely to be especially challenging, because the sites assigned to the NPL are the most 
polluted ones in the US.  For example, what would have happened to housing prices in Love Canal, NY, 
in the absence of the famous Superfund clean-up there?   
                                                     
1 Further, the increasing reliance on stated preference techniques to value environmental amenities is surely related 
to dissatisfaction with the performance of revealed preference techniques.  See Hanemann (1994)) and Diamond and 
Hausman (1994) for discussions of stated preference techniques. 
2 Throughout the paper, monetary figures are reported in 2000 $’s, unless otherwise noted. 
To solve this problem, we implement a quasi-experiment based on knowledge of the selection 
rule that the EPA used to develop the first NPL in 1983.  The EPA was only allocated enough money to 
conduct 400 clean-ups.  After cutting the list of candidate sites from 15,000 to 690, the EPA invented and 
implemented the Hazardous Ranking System (HRS) that assigned each site a score from 0 to 100 based 
on the risk it posed, with 100 being the most dangerous.  The EPA placed the 400 sites with HRS scores 
exceeding 28.5 on the initial NPL in 1983, making them eligible for Superfund remedial clean-ups.  We 
compare the evolution of housing market outcomes between 1980 and 2000 in areas near sites that had 
initial HRS scores above and below the 28.5 threshold.  We also implement a regression discontinuity 
design (Cook and Campbell 1979) to focus the comparisons among sites with scores near the threshold. 
To structure the analysis, we model the consequences of a quasi-experiment that leads to an 
exogenous change in a local amenity in the context of the hedonic method (Freeman 1974; Rosen 1974).     
We show that if consumers value the clean-ups, then there are two empirical predictions.  First, the 
improvement at the site should lead to increases in the demand and supply of local housing and, in turn, 
increases in the prices and quantities of houses.  Second, the improvement should lead to sorting such that 
the share of the population living near the improved sites that places a high value on environmental 
quality increases.  The implication is that an exclusive focus on housing prices as in previous quasi-
experimental hedonic studies (Chay and Greenstone 2005; Linden and Rockoff 2006) may obscure part of 
the welfare gain. 
The results suggest that individuals place a small value on a hazardous waste site’s inclusion on 
the NPL and subsequent clean-up.  Specifically, we find that a site’s placement on the NPL is associated 
with economically small and statistically indistinguishable from zero local changes in residential property 
values, property rental rates, housing supply, total population, and the types of individuals living near the 
site.  These findings are robust to a wide variety of specification checks, and they hold whether they are 
measured 7 (in 1990) or 17 (in 2000) years after placement on the NPL.  Overall, these findings suggest 
that the mean local benefits of a Superfund clean-up as measured through the housing market are 
substantially lower than our estimated average cost of $43 million per Superfund clean-up. 
The conventional hedonic approach compares areas surrounding NPL sites with the remainder of 
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the US.  In contrast to the HRS research design, the conventional approach produces estimates that 
suggest that gains in property values exceed the mean costs of clean-up.  However, these regressions also 
produce a number of puzzling results that undermine confidence in the approach’s validity.  Further, there 
is evidence that the conventional approach is likely to confound the effect of the presence of a NPL site 
with other determinants of housing market outcomes.  Notably, the HRS research design appears to 
greatly reduce the confounding. 
The study is conducted with the most comprehensive data file ever compiled by the EPA or other 
researchers on the Superfund program and its effects.  The resulting database has information on all 1,400 
Superfund hazardous waste sites as of 2000, the sites that narrowly missed placement on the initial NPL, 
and census-tract level housing market outcomes for 1980 (before the release of the first NPL), 1990, and 
2000.  Consequently, this study is a substantial departure from the previous Superfund/hazardous waste 
site hedonic literature, which is entirely comprised of examinations of one or a handful of sites and 
collectively covers just 30 different sites (Schmalensee et al. 1975; Michaels and Smith 1990; Kohlhase 
1991; Kiel 1995; Gayer, Hamilton, and Viscusi 2000 and 2002; Kiel and Zabel 2001; McCluskey and 
Rausser 2003; Ihlanfeldt and Taylor 2004; Messer et al. 2004; and Farrell 2004).3
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section I provides background on the Superfund program and 
how the HRS research design may allow for credible estimation of the effects of Superfund clean-ups on 
housing market outcomes.  Section II discusses how to use hedonic theory to provide an economic 
interpretation for the results from the HRS research design.  Section III details the data sources and 
provides some summary statistics.  Sections IV and V report on the econometric methods and empirical 
findings, respectively.  Section VI interprets the results, while VII concludes. 
 
I. The Superfund Program and a New Research Design 
                                                     
3  Using EPA estimates of the probability of cancer cases and the costs of Superfund clean-ups, Viscusi and 
Hamilton (1999) find that at the median site expenditure the average cost per cancer case averted by the clean-up 
exceeds $6 billion.  This health effects approach requires knowledge of the toxics present and the pathways they 
travel, the health risk associated with a toxic by pathway pair, the size of the affected population, the pathway-
specific exposure, and the willingness to pay to avoid mortality/morbidity.  Due to the state of scientific uncertainty 
associated with each step, we think this approach is unlikely to produce credible benefit estimates.  
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A. History and Broad Program Goals 
 Before the regulation of the disposal of hazardous wastes by the Toxic Substances Control and 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Acts of 1976, industrial firms frequently disposed of wastes by 
burying them in the ground.  Love Canal, NY is perhaps the most infamous example of these disposal 
practices.  Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, this area was a landfill for industrial waste, and more than 
21,000 tons of chemical wastes were ultimately deposited there.  After New York state investigators 
found high concentrations of dangerous chemicals in the air and soil at Love Canal, concerns about the 
safety of this area prompted President Carter to declare a state of emergency in 1978 that led to the 
relocation of the 900 residents.  The Love Canal incident helped to galvanize support for addressing the 
legacy of industrial waste, and this led to the creation of the Superfund program in 1980.   
The centerpiece of the Superfund program, and this paper’s focus, is the long-run remediation of 
hazardous waste sites.4  These multi-year remediation efforts aim to reduce permanently the serious, but 
not imminently life-threatening, dangers caused by hazardous substances.  1,552 sites have been placed 
on the NPL by the end of 2005 and thereby chosen for these long-run clean-ups.  The next subsection 
describes the selection process, which forms the basis of our research design.   
 
B.  Site Assessment & Superfund Clean-Ups Processes 
As of 1996, more than 40,000 hazardous waste sites had been referred to the EPA for possible 
inclusion on the NPL.  Since there are limited resources available for these clean-ups, the EPA follows a 
multi-step process to identify the most dangerous sites. 
The final step of the assessment process is the application of the Hazardous Ranking System 
(HRS), which is reserved for the most dangerous sites.  The EPA developed the HRS in 1982 as a 
standardized approach to identify the sites that pose the greatest threat to humans and the environment.  
The original HRS evaluated the risk for exposure to chemical pollutants along three migration 
                                                     
4 The Superfund program also funds immediate removals, which are short-term responses to environmental 
emergencies aimed at diminishing an immediate threat.  These actions are not intended to remediate the underlying 
environmental problem and are not exclusive to hazardous waste sites on the NPL. 
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‘pathways’: groundwater, surface water, and air.  The major determinants of risk along each pathway for 
a site are the toxicity and concentration of chemicals present, the likelihood of exposure and proximity to 
humans, and the size of the potentially affected population.  The non-human impact is also considered but 
plays a minor role in determining the HRS score.   
The HRS produces a score that ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 being the highest level of risk.  
From 1982-1995, the EPA assigned all hazardous waste sites with a HRS score of 28.5 or greater to the 
NPL.  These sites are the only ones that are eligible for Superfund remedial clean-up.  The Data Appendix 
provides further details on the determination of HRS test scores and their role in assignment to the NPL.  
 Once a site is placed on the NPL, it generally takes many years until clean-up is complete.  The 
first step is a further study of the extent of the environmental problem and how best to remedy it.  This 
assessment is summarized in the Record of Decision (ROD), which also outlines the clean-up actions that 
are planned for the site.  The site receives the “construction complete” designation once the physical 
construction of all clean-up remedies is complete, the immediate threats to health have been removed, and 
the long-run threats are “under control.”  The final step is the site’s deletion from the NPL.   
 
C. 1982 HRS Scores as the Basis of a New Research Design 
 This paper’s goal is to obtain reliable estimates of the effect of Superfund sponsored clean-ups of 
hazardous waste sites on housing market outcomes in areas surrounding the sites.  The empirical 
challenge is that NPL sites are the most polluted in the US, so it is likely that there are unobserved factors 
that covary with both proximity to hazardous waste sites and housing prices.  Although this possibility 
cannot be tested directly, it is notable that proximity to a hazardous waste site is associated with lower 
population densities, lower household incomes, higher percentages of high school dropouts, and a higher 
fraction of mobile homes among the housing stock. 
 Consequently, cross-sectional estimates of the association between housing prices and proximity 
to a hazardous waste site may be severely biased due to omitted variables.5  In fact, the possibility of 
                                                     
5 Cross-sectional models for housing prices have exhibited signs of misspecification in a number of other settings, 
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confounding due to unobserved variables has been recognized as a threat to the use of the hedonic method 
to develop reliable estimates of individuals’ willingness to pay for environmental amenities since its 
invention (Small 1975).  This paper’s challenge is to develop a valid counterfactual for the housing 
market outcomes near Superfund sites in the absence of their placement on the NPL and clean-up.  
A feature of the initial NPL assignment process that has not been noted previously by researchers 
may provide a credible solution to the likely omitted variables problem.  In the first year after the 
legislation’s passage, 14,697 sites were referred to the EPA and investigated as potential candidates for 
remedial action.  Through an initial assessment process, the EPA winnowed this list to the 690 most 
dangerous sites.  Although the Superfund legislation directed the EPA to develop a NPL of “at least” 400 
sites (Section 105(8)(B) of CERCLA), budgetary considerations caused the EPA to set a goal of placing 
exactly 400 sites on the NPL. 
The EPA developed the HRS to provide a scientific basis for determining the 400 out of the 690 
sites that posed the greatest risk.  Pressured to initiate the clean-ups quickly, the EPA developed the HRS 
in about a year.  It was applied to the 690 worst sites, and their scores were ordered from highest to 
lowest.  A score of 28.5 divided numbers 400 and 401, so the initial NPL published in September 1983 
was limited to sites with HRS scores exceeding 28.5.  See the Data Appendix for further details. 
The central role of the HRS score provides a compelling basis for a research design that compares 
housing market outcomes near sites with initial scores above and below the 28.5 cut-off for at least three 
reasons.  First, it is unlikely that sites’ HRS scores were manipulated to affect their placement on the 
NPL, because the 28.5 threshold was established after the testing of the 690 sites was completed.  The 
HRS scores therefore reflected the EPA’s assessment of the risks posed by each site and were not based 
on the expected costs or benefits of clean-up.   
Second, the HRS scores are noisy measures of risk, so it is possible that true risks are similar 
                                                                                                                                                                           
including the relationships between land prices and school quality, air pollution, and climate variables (Black 1999; 
Chay and Greenstone 2005; Deschenes and Greenstone 2006).  Incorrect choice of functional form is an alternative 
source of misspecification (Halvorsen and Pollakowski 1981; Cropper et al. 1988).  Other potential sources of biases 
of published hedonic estimates include measurement error and publication bias (Black and Kneisner 2003; 
Ashenfelter and Greenstone 2004).  
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above and below the threshold.  This noisiness was a consequence of the scientific uncertainty about the 
health consequences of exposure to the tens of thousands of chemicals present at these sites.6  Further, 
there wasn’t any evidence that sites with HRS scores below 28.5 posed little risk to health.  The Federal 
Register specifically reported that the “EPA has not made a determination that sites scoring less than 
28.50 do not present a significant risk to human health, welfare, or the environment” and that a more 
informative test would require “greater time and funds” (Federal Register, September 21, 1984).7
Third, the selection rule that determined placement on the NPL is a highly nonlinear function of 
the HRS score, which allows for a quasi-experimental regression discontinuity design.  Specifically, we 
will compare outcomes at sites “near” the 28.5 cut-off.  If the unobservables are similar or changing 
smoothly around the regulatory threshold, then it is possible to make causal inferences.8   
An additional feature of the analysis is that an initial score above 28.5 is highly correlated with 
eventual NPL status but is not a perfect predictor of it.  This is because some sites were rescored, with the 
later scores determining whether they ended up on the NPL.9  The subsequent analysis uses an indicator 
variable for whether a site’s initial (i.e., 1982) HRS score was above 28.5 as an instrumental variable for 
whether a site was on the NPL in order to purge the potentially endogenous variation in NPL status.     
 Finally, it important to emphasize that sites that failed to qualify for the NPL were ineligible for 
Superfund remediations.  We investigated whether these sites were cleaned-up under state or local 
                                                     
6 A recent history of Superfund’s makes this point.  “At the inception of EPA’s Superfund program, there was much 
to be learned about industrial wastes and their potential for causing public health problems.  Before this problem 
could be addressed on the program level, the types of wastes most often found at sites needed to be determined, and 
their health effects studied.  Identifying and quantifying risks to health and the environment for the extremely broad 
range of conditions, chemicals, and threats at uncontrolled hazardous wastes sites posed formidable problems.  
Many of these problems stemmed from the lack of information concerning the toxicities of the over 65,000 different 
industrial chemicals listed as having been in commercial production since 1945” (EPA 2000, p. 3-2). 
7 One way to measure the crude nature of the initial HRS test is by the detail of the guidelines used for determining 
the HRS score.  The guidelines used to develop the initial HRS sites were collected in a 30 page manual.  Today, the 
analogous manual is more than 500 pages. 
8 The research design of comparing sites with HRS scores “near” the 28.5 is unlikely to be valid for sites that 
received an initial HRS score after 1982.  This is because once the 28.5 cut-off was set, the HRS testers were 
encouraged to minimize testing costs and simply determine whether a site exceeded the threshold.  Consequently, 
testers generally stop scoring pathways once enough pathways are scored to produce a score above the threshold.   
9 As an example, 144 sites with initial scores above 28.5 were rescored and this led to 7 sites receiving revised 
scores below the cut-off.  Further, complaints by citizens and others led to rescoring at a number of sites below the 
cut-off.  Although there has been substantial research on the question of which sites on the NPL are cleaned-up first 
(see, e.g., Sigman 2001), we are unaware of any research on the determinants of a site being rescored.  
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programs and found that they were frequently left untouched.  Among the sites that were targeted by these 
programs, a typical solution was to put a fence around the site and place signs indicating the presence of 
health hazards.  The point is that the remediation activities at NPL sites drastically exceeded the clean-up 
activities at non-NPL sites in scope and cost.  
 
II. Using Hedonics to Value Changes in Local Environmental Quality Due to Superfund Clean-ups 
 An explicit market for a clean local environment does not exist.  The hedonic price method is 
commonly used to infer the economic value of non-market amenities like environmental quality to 
individuals.  To date, its empirical implementation has generally been in cross-sectional settings where it 
is reasonable to assume that consumers and producers have already made their optimizing decisions.  This 
section briefly reviews the cross-sectional equilibrium.  It then discusses how an improvement in local 
environmental quality due to a Superfund clean-up leads agents to alter their utility and profit-maximizing 
decisions and the resulting new equilibrium.  The purpose of this discussion is to devise an empirical 
strategy to infer the welfare consequences of Superfund clean-ups using decennial Census data.   
 
A. A Brief Review of Equilibrium in the Hedonic Model 
Economists have estimated the association between housing prices and environmental amenities 
at least since Ridker (1967) and Ridker and Henning (1967).  However, Rosen (1974) and Freeman 
(1974) were the first to give this correlation an economic interpretation.  In the Rosen formulation, a 
differentiated good is described by a vector of its characteristics, C = (c1, c2,…, cn).  In the case of a 
house, these characteristics may include structural attributes (e.g., number of bedrooms), neighborhood 
public services (e.g., local school quality), and local environmental amenities (e.g., distance from a 
hazardous waste site).  Thus, the market price of the ith house can be written as: 
(1) Pi = P(ci1, ci2,…, cin). 
The partial derivative of P(•) with respect to the jth characteristic, ∂P/∂cj, is referred to as the marginal 
implicit price.  It is the marginal price of the jth characteristic implicit in the overall price of the house, 
holding constant all other characteristics. 
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 In the hedonic model, the locus between housing prices and a characteristic, or the hedonic price 
schedule (HPS), is generated by the equilibrium interactions of consumers and producers.  It is assumed 
that markets are competitive, all consumers rent one house at the market price, and utility depends on 
consumption of the numeraire, X (with price equal to 1), and the vector of house characteristics: 
(2) u = u(X,C). 
The budget constraint is expressed as I – P – X = 0, where I is income.   
Maximization of (2) with respect to the budget constraint reveals that individuals choose levels of 
each of the characteristics to satisfy (∂U/∂cj) / (∂U/∂x) = ∂P/∂cj.  Thus, the marginal willingness to pay for 
cj (e.g., local environmental quality) must equal the marginal cost of an extra unit of cj in the market. 
 It is convenient to substitute the budget constraint into (2), which gives u = u(I- P, c1, c2,…, cn).  
By inverting this equation and holding all characteristics of the house but j constant, an expression for 
willingness to pay for cj is obtained: 
(3) Bj = Bj (I - P, cj, C-j*, u*).  
Here, u* is the highest level of utility attainable given the budget constraint and C-j* is the optimal 
quantities of other characteristics.  This is referred to as a bid (or indifference) curve, because it reveals 
the maximum amount that an individual would pay for different values of cj, holding utility constant. 
 Heterogeneity in individuals’ bid functions due to differences in preferences and/or incomes leads 
to differences in the chosen quantities of a characteristic.  This is depicted in Figure 1a, which plots the 
HPS and bid curves for cj of three consumer types.  The consumers are denoted as types #1, #2, and #3, 
and potentially there are an unlimited number of each type.  Each bid function reveals the standard 
declining marginal rate of substitution between cj and X (because X = I – P).  The three types choose 
houses in locations where their marginal willingness to pay for cj is equal to the market determined 
marginal implicit price, which occur at cj1, cj2, and cj3, respectively.  Given market prices, these 
consumers’ utilities would be lower at sites with higher or lower levels of local environmental quality.  
The other side of the market is comprised of suppliers of housing services.  We assume that 
suppliers are heterogeneous due to differences in their cost functions.  This heterogeneity may result from 
differences in the land they own.  For example, it may be very expensive to provide a high level of local 
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environmental quality on a plot of land located near a steel factory.  By inverting a supplier’s profit 
function, we can derive its offer curve for the characteristic cj: 
(4) Oj = Oj (cj, C-j*, π*), 
where π* is the maximum available profit given its cost function and the HPS.  Figure 1a depicts offer 
curves for three types of suppliers.  With this set-up, individuals that live in a house that they own would 
be both consumers and suppliers and their supplier self would rent to their consumer self. 
The HPS is formed by tangencies between consumers’ bid and suppliers’ offer functions.  At each 
point on the HPS, the marginal price of a housing characteristic is equal to an individual’s marginal 
willingness to pay for that characteristic and an individual supplier’s marginal cost of producing it.  From 
the consumer’s perspective, the gradient of the HPS with respect to local environmental quality gives the 
equilibrium differential that compensates consumers for accepting the increased health risk and aesthetic 
disamenities associated with lower local environmental quality.  Put another way, areas with poor 
environmental quality must have lower housing prices to attract potential homeowners, and the HPS 
reveals the price that allocates consumers across locations.  Thus, the HPS can be used to infer the welfare 
effects of a marginal change in a characteristic.  From the suppliers’ perspective, the gradient of the HPS 
reveals the costs of supplying a cleaner local environment.     
 
B. What are the Consequences of a Large Change in Environmental Quality in the Hedonic Model? 
This study assesses the impacts of Superfund remediations of hazardous waste sites, which intend 
to cause non-marginal improvements in environmental quality near the site.  This subsection extends and 
fleshes out the hedonic model to describe the theoretical impacts of these clean-ups on consumers, 
suppliers, and social welfare.  Any impacts on the labor market are ignored, because wage changes don’t 
affect welfare since any gains (losses) for workers are offset by losses (gains) for firms (Roback 1982).   
The Impacts of an Amenity Improvement on Consumers and Suppliers.  We focus on the case 
where the overall HPS does not shift in response to the increased supply of “clean” sites.  The assumption 
of a constant HPS may be valid because to date only 670 Superfund sites have been completely 
remediated.  They are located in just 624 of the 65,443 US census tracts, which constitutes a small part of 
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the US housing market.   
Now, consider the clean-up of a hazardous waste site that increases local environmental quality 
from cj1 to cj3 as in Figure 1a in the neighborhood surrounding the site.  It is evident from the HPS that the 
rental price of housing near the improved site will rise to p3.  For type #1 consumers, the increase in the 
rental rate exceeds their willingness to pay for the clean-up.  Consequently, their neighborhood has 
become too expensive, given their preferences and income, and the clean-up reduces their utility.  
The result is that consumers will migrate between communities to restore the equilibrium.  The 
type #1 consumers that had chosen the improved site based on its previous rental price and environmental 
quality will move to a house with their originally chosen and optimal values of p and cj (i.e., p1 and cj1).  
Additionally, some type #3 consumers will move near the newly cleaned-up site, where they will 
consume cj3 at a price of p3.  So assuming zero moving costs10, the key result is that some consumers will 
change locations, but their utility is unchanged because they choose locations with their original cj and p.  
One consequence of this taste-based sorting is that the residents of the improved neighborhood 
will have greater unobserved taste for environmental quality and/or higher incomes.11  Thus, the marginal 
resident will be less tolerant of exposure to hazardous waste.  We test for this taste-based sorting below. 
In this set-up, land owners near the site are the only agents whose welfare is affected by the 
clean-up.  If residential and commercial land markets are perfectly integrated, then the higher rental rates 
are a pure benefit for all landowners because the change in environmental quality is costless for them.  In 
this case, the supply of land for residential purposes is fixed. 
It is possible that the residential and non-residential land markets are not perfectly integrated, 
perhaps due to zoning laws, which are costly to change (Glaeser and Gyourko 2003).  In this case, the 
increase in rental prices is still a pure benefit for owners of residential land near the site.  The higher rents 
                                                     
10 For simplicity, we assume zero moving costs although this surely isn’t correct.  In the presence of moving costs, 
renters are made worse off by the amount of the moving costs.  See Bayer, Keohane, and Timmins (2006) on the 
impacts of moving costs on the valuation of air pollution. 
11 See Banzhaf and Walsh (2005) and Cameron and McConnaha (2005) for evidence of migration induced by 
environmental changes.  In principle, the new residents’ incomes could have a direct effect on individuals’ 
valuations of living in the community.  We ignore this possibility here because this will not create any social 
benefits as long as the benefits from living near high income individuals are sufficiently linear. 
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for residential land will cause some owners of non-residential land to find it profitable to convert their 
land to residential usage.  Presumably, the pre-clean-up rental rate of the converted land had been higher 
when in the non-residential sector and/or there may be costs associated with conversion (e.g., legal fees 
associated with rezoning), so the benefits for owners of converted land are smaller than for owners of land 
that was already used for residential housing.  Ultimately, the benefits of conversion determine the shape 
of the supply curve of residential land near the site and the welfare gain for these land owners.  The 
empirical analysis tests for supply responses.   
To summarize, there are four predicted impacts of an amenity improvement.  First, the price of 
land (and housing) near the improved site will increase.  Second, consumers will respond with taste-based 
sorting.  Third, the supply of residential land (and housing) near the site is likely to increase.  Fourth, the 
entire welfare gain accrues to land owners.  We discuss how to test these predictions with decennial 
Census data after we develop a formal expression for the welfare effects of a Superfund clean-up.  
A General Expression for the Full Welfare Effects.  The full welfare benefits are the sum of all 
consumers’ and suppliers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for the change in local environmental quality.  In 
contrast to the preceding discussion, here we allow for the possibility that the remediation alters relative 
prices so that local environmental quality is less expensive.  A change in relative prices could affect all 
consumers and suppliers.  Consequently, it is now necessary to account for the WTP of agents living near 
the improved sites and elsewhere.12  
The benefits for consumers can be expressed as: 
(5a) ∆ Total Consumer WTP =  ∑i [Bi(cij*post, C-ij*, ui*) - Bi(cij*pre, C-ij*, ui*)]  
- ∑i [Pipost(cij*post, C-ij*) - Pipre(cij*pre, C-ij*)], 
where i indexes a household and there are n households (i=1,..., n) in the country.  “Pre” is before the 
clean-up and “post” is after it and all adjustments are complete.13  Thus, each consumer’s WTP is equal to 
the difference in her valuation of exposure to cij*post and cij*pre minus the difference in the rental rates at 
                                                     
12 See Bartik (1988) and Freeman (2003) for more extensive discussions of the general welfare impacts of non-
marginal amenity improvements. 
13 For simplicity, we assume that consumers do not adjust their consumption of the other characteristics so C-ij*Pre =  
C-ij*Pre).  We make the analogous assumption about suppliers. 
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these values of cij.  
The benefits for suppliers can be expressed as:  
(5b) ∆ Total Supplier WTP =  ∑k [Pkpost(ckj*post, C-kj*) – Pkpre(ckj*pre, C-kj*)]  
- ∑k [τk(ckj*post, C-kj*) – τk(ckj*pre, C-kj*)], 
where k indexes a supplier and there are m (k= 1,…, m) suppliers in the country.  τk(C) is supplier k’s 
cost of producing a house with characteristics C.  So each supplier’s WTP is equal to the pre and post 
difference in price minus the difference in costs. 
Thus, the societal change in welfare is the sum of equations (5a) and (5b).  The price change is a 
transfer from buyers to sellers so it cancels out.  Consequently, the total change in welfare equals the 
difference in consumers’ total willingness to pay at the new and old levels of environmental quality minus 
the change in suppliers’ costs.  The implementation of this approach requires reliable estimates of all 
consumers’ bid functions and all suppliers’ cost functions.  
Three decades after the publication of the original Rosen article, this hedonic approach to 
estimating the value of amenity changes has not met with great empirical success for at least two reasons.  
First, the estimation of even a single individual’s/taste type’s bid function has proven to be extremely 
challenging, because it is impossible to observe the same individual facing two sets of prices in a cross-
section.14  The difficulty of this task was first underscored by Epple (1987) and Bartik (1987) who 
showed that taste-based sorting undermines efforts to infer consumers’ bid functions from the HPS.15  
Second, the implementation of this approach requires estimates of bid functions for all consumers and 
cost functions for all suppliers in the economy.  This is a tremendous amount of information, and there is 
a consensus that existing data sources are not up to the task. 
 
C. Can We Learn about the Welfare Effects of Superfund Clean-ups from Decennial Census Data? 
This subsection considers how decennial census data on housing and demographic variables can 
                                                     
14 Rosen (1974) proposed a 2-step approach for estimating bid functions (and offer curves). He later wrote, “It is 
clear that nothing can be learned about the structure of preferences in a single cross-section” (Rosen 1986, p. 658).   
15 In a recent paper, Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim (2004) outline the assumptions necessary to identify the 
demand (and supply) functions in an additive version of the hedonic model with data from a single market. 
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be used to learn about the welfare effects of Superfund clean-ups.   There are at least two features of these 
data that merit noting because they affect the form and interpretation of the subsequent empirical analysis.   
The first feature is that census tracts are the smallest unit of observation that can be matched 
across the 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses.  This means that it is infeasible to observe individuals over 
time and therefore to obtain estimates of their bid and cost functions.  Consequently, we now consider the 
impacts of a clean-up in the context of census tract-level demand and supply functions for residential 
land, which are determined by the bid and cost functions of local consumers and suppliers. 
We begin with the case where the supply curve for residential land near a hazardous waste site is 
perfectly inelastic, which is likely to be the case in the short-run, and demand is downward sloping.  This 
is depicted in Figure 1b with S1 and D1 and equilibrium outcome (P1, Q1).  Now, consider an exogenous 
increase in environmental quality due to a clean-up.  The improvement raises current residents’ valuation 
of living near the formerly dirty site and, as sketched out in the previous subsection, with free migration 
individuals with even higher valuations of environmental quality will move in.  The net result is that the 
demand curve for residential housing near the improved site shifts out.  This is depicted as D2 and causes 
prices to increase to P2 but leaves quantities unchanged.  
With a parallel shift in the demand curve and no change in the HPS, the welfare gain is the sum 
of the shaded areas A1 and A2 in Figure 1b.  This equals the mean change in price times the number of 
residential plots of land and entirely accrues to suppliers or landowners.  From a practical perspective, the 
challenge is to accurately measure the change in house or residential land prices near the improved site. 
In the longer run, supply is likely to be more elastic due to the conversion of non-residential land, 
and the remediation will lead to changes in prices and quantities.  Figure 1b depicts the unrealistic polar 
case where supply is perfectly elastic as S2.  With this supply curve, the new equilibrium combination is 
(P1, Q2), which reflects a substantial gain in quantities but no change in prices.  The gain in welfare is 
entirely an increase in consumer surplus and is the sum of the shaded areas B1, B2, and A2.  Previous 
applications of the hedonic method have generally examined prices only, so they may have understated 
(potentially dramatically) the welfare gain associated with amenity improvements. 
It is evident that with census-tract data the development of a full welfare measure requires 
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knowledge of the shapes of the supply and demand curves.  We are unaware of a credible strategy for 
separately identifying supply and demand over the 10 year periods between censuses.  In this situation, 
precise welfare calculations require ad hoc assumptions about the elasticities of supply and demand, 
except for the case where neither prices nor quantities change.  In fact, the subsequent analysis finds small 
changes in prices and quantities, so our primary conclusion is that Superfund remediations did not 
substantially increase social welfare. 
The census tract-level demographic data can also be used to test the theoretical prediction of 
taste-based sorting in response to remediations.  An increase in the number of high income individuals or 
people that are likely to place a high value on environmental quality in areas near the remediated sites 
would provide complementary evidence that the clean-ups are valued.  In contrast, a failure to find these 
population shifts near the sites would suggest that the clean-ups did not lead to substantial welfare gains. 
 The second feature of the data that merits highlighting is that they are only available in 1980, 
1990, and 2000.  Ideally, we would like to measure the impact of a site’s placement on the NPL 
immediately after the announcement so any benefits are in the future and homeowners will naturally 
discount them by the rate of time preference.  An immediate measurement of the impact on prices would 
ensure that we have captured the impact of the clean-up on the value of housing services in all years.  
However, the first NPL was released in 1983, and housing prices cannot be observed again until 1990 or 
2000. By then, some of the clean-ups will have been completed, and the time to completion for the others 
(relative to 1983) will have been greatly reduced.  For this reason, the measurement of the impacts of the 
NPL designation with 1990 or 2000 Census data will overstate the properly measured benefits. 
 
III. Data Sources and Summary Statistics 
A. Data Sources 
We constructed the most comprehensive data file ever compiled on the Superfund program.  It 
contains detailed information on all hazardous waste sites placed on the NPL by 2000, as well as the 
hazardous waste sites with 1982 HRS scores below 28.5.  We also compiled housing price, housing 
characteristic, and neighborhood demographic information for areas surrounding these sites.  This 
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subsection describes the data sources.  More details are provided in the Data Appendix and Greenstone 
and Gallagher (2005). 
The housing, demographic and economic data come from Geolytics’s Neighborhood Change 
Database, which includes information from the 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses.  Importantly, the 
1980 data predate the publication of the first NPL in 1983.  We collected the longitude and latitude for 
each of the hazardous waste sites and used this information to place all sites in a unique census tract.    
We use the Geolytics data to form a panel of census tracts based on 2000 census tract boundaries, 
which are drawn so that they include approximately 4,000 people in 2000.  Census tracts are the smallest 
geographic unit that can be matched across the 1970-2000 Censuses.  The Census Bureau placed the 
entire country in tracts in 2000.  Geolytics fit 1970, 1980, and 1990 census tract data to the year 2000 
census tract boundaries to form a panel.  The primary limitation of this approach is that in 1970 and 1980, 
the US Census Bureau only tracted areas that were considered ‘urban’ or belonged to a metropolitan area.  
The result is that the remaining areas of the country cannot be matched to a 2000 census tract, so the 1970 
and 1980 values of the Census variables are missing for 2000 tracts that include these areas.  
 The analysis is restricted to the 48,147 out of the 65,443 2000 census tracts that have non-missing 
housing price data in 1980, 1990, and 2000.  This sample includes 985 of the 1,398 sites listed on the 
NPL before January 1, 2000 and 487 of the 690 sites which were tested for inclusion on the initial NPL.  
The addition of the sample restriction that 1970 housing prices be nonmissing would have further reduced 
the sample to include just 37,519 census tracts, 708 of the NPL sites, and 353 of the 1982 HRS sites. 
The subsequent analysis uses three different groupings of census tracts.  The first conducts the 
analysis at the census tract level.  The second implements an analysis among census tracts that share a 
border with the tracts that contain the hazardous waste sites (but excludes the tracts that contain the sites).  
In this case, each observation is comprised of the weighted average of all variables across these 
neighboring tracts, where the weights are the 1980 populations of the tracts.   
The unit of observation in the third grouping is the land area within circles of varying radii that 
are centered at the sites.  For these observations, the census variables are calculated as the weighted 
means across the portion of tracts that fall within the relevant circle.  The weights are the fraction of each 
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tract’s land area within the relevant circle multiplied by its 1980 population.16  In choosing the optimal 
radius, we attempted to balance the conflicting goals of requiring houses to be near enough to the sites so 
that it is plausible that residents would value a clean-up and making the area large enough so that 
implausibly large increases in housing prices aren’t required for clean-ups to pass a cost-benefit test.  In 
the subsequent tables, we focus on circles with radii of 2-miles and 3-miles.17  The mean 1980 values of 
the housing stocks in these circles are $349 and $796 million and the mean (median) number of census 
tracts that are at least partially inside these circles are 9.9 (8) and 18.2 (12), respectively.  
We also collected a number of variables about the hazardous waste sites.  All HRS composite 
scores, as well as separate groundwater, surface water, and air pathway scores, were obtained from 
various issues of the Federal Register.  The same source was used to determine the dates of NPL listing.  
The EPA provided a data file that reported the dates of the release of the ROD, initiation of clean-up, 
completion of remediation (i.e., construction complete), and deletion from the NPL for sites that achieved 
these milestones.  Information on each NPL site’s size in acres comes from the RODs.  Finally, we 
collected data on the expected costs of clean-up before remediation was initiated and estimated actual 
costs for sites that reached the construction complete stage.  Greenstone and Gallagher’s (2005) Data 
Appendix provides more information on the costs of clean-ups (also see Probst and Konisky 2001).  
 
B. Summary Statistics 
The analysis is conducted with two samples of hazardous waste sites.  The first is called the “All 
NPL Sample” and includes the 1,398 hazardous waste sites in the 50 US states and the District of 
Columbia that were placed on the NPL by January 1, 2000.  The second is the “1982 HRS Sample” and is 
comprised of the 690 hazardous waste sites tested for inclusion on the initial NPL. 
                                                     
16 A limitation of the GIS determined circle approach is that street address level data on housing prices and the 
covariates is unavailable.  We assign a census tract’s average to the portion of the tract that falls within the circle, 
which is equivalent to assuming that there is no heterogeneity in housing prices or other variables within a tract.     
17 Our use of a 3-mile radius is consistent with the EPA’s and scientific community’s positions on the distance from 
a Superfund site that the contaminants could be expected to impact human health.  The 1982 Federal Register 
reports, “The three-mile radius used in the HRS is based on EPA's experience that, in most cases currently under 
investigation, contaminants can migrant to at least this distance. It should be noted that no commentators disagreed 
with the selection of three miles for technical or scientific reasons” (Federal Register July 16, 1982). 
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 Table 1 presents summary statistics on the hazardous waste sites in these samples.  The entries in 
column (1) are from the All NPL Sample and are limited to sites in a census tract for which there is non-
missing housing price data in 1980, 1990, and 2000.  After these sample restrictions, there are 985 sites, 
which is more than 70% of the sites placed on the NPL by 2000.  Columns (2) and (3) report data from 
the 1982 HRS Sample.  The column (2) entries are based on the 487 sites located in a census tract with 
complete housing price data.  Column (3) reports on the remaining 189 sites located in census tracts with 
incomplete housing price data (generally due to missing 1980 data).  14 sites are outside of the continental 
United States and were dropped from the sample.   
 Panel A reports on the timing of the sites’ placement on the NPL.  Column (1) reveals that about 
75% of all NPL sites received this designation in the 1980s.  Together, columns (2) and (3) demonstrate 
that 443 of the 676 sites in the 1982 HRS Sample eventually were placed on the NPL.  This number 
exceeds the 400 sites that Congress set as an explicit goal, because, as we have discussed, some sites with 
initial scores below 28.5 were rescored and then received scores above the threshold qualifying them for 
the NPL.  Panel B demonstrates that mean HRS scores are similar across the columns.  
Panel C reports on the size of the hazardous waste sites measured in acres, which is available for 
NPL sites only.  The median site size ranges between 25 and 35 acres across the samples.  The means are 
substantially larger due to a few very large sites.  The modest size of most sites suggests that any expected 
effects on property values are likely to be confined to relatively small geographic areas around the sites.   
Panel D reveals that the clean-up process is slow.  The median time until the different milestones 
are achieved is reported, rather than the mean, because many sites have not reached all of the milestones 
yet.  198 (16) of the NPL sites in column (2) received either the construction complete or deleted 
designation by 2000 (1990).  For this reason, we focus on changes in housing prices and quantities 
between 1980 and 2000.  We will also assess how rental rates change as sites move through the different 
stages of the clean-up process. 
Panel E reports the expected costs of clean-up for NPL sites, and F details expected and actual 
costs among sites that are construction complete or deleted.  The expected costs are measured before any 
remediation activities have begun, while actual costs are our best estimates of total remediation related 
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expenditures assessed after the site is construction complete.  We believe this is the first time these 
variables have been reported for the same sites.  In the 1982 HRS Sample that we focus on (i.e., column 
(2)), the mean and median expected costs are $27.5 million and $15.0 million.   
Among the construction complete sites in the 1982 HRS Sample, the mean actual costs exceed 
the expected costs by about 55%.  We multiply the overall mean expected cost of $27.5 million by 1.55 to 
obtain an estimate of the mean actual costs of clean-up in the 1982 HRS Sample of $43 million.  This 
estimate of costs understates the true costs, because it does not include the legal costs or deadweight loss 
associated with the collection of funds from private parties or taxes, nor does it include the site’s share of 
the EPA’s costs of administering Superfund.  Nevertheless, it is contrasted with the estimated benefits of 
Superfund clean-ups in the remainder of the paper. 
A comparison of columns (2) and (3) across the panels reveals that the sites with and without 
complete housing price data are similar on a number of dimensions.  For example, the mean HRS scores 
conditional on scoring above and below 28.5 are remarkably similar.  Further, the median size and 
various cost variables are comparable in the two columns.  Consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that the sites without complete housing price data are similar to the column (2) sites, suggesting the 
subsequent results may be representative for the entire 1982 HRS Sample. 
 Moreover, the sites in column (1) are similar to the sites in column (2) and (3) in size and the two 
cost variables.  The mean HRS scores are a few points lower, but this comparison is not meaningful due 
to the changes in the test over time and changes in the how the scoring was conducted.  Overall, the 
similarity of the column (1) sites with the other sites suggests that it may be reasonable to assume that the 
results from the application of the HRS research design to the 1982 HRS Sample are informative about 
the effects of the other Superfund clean-ups. 
 We now graphically summarize some other features of the two samples.  Figure 2 displays the 
geographic distribution of the 985 hazardous waste sites with complete housing data in the All NPL 
Sample.  There are NPL sites in 45 of the 48 continental states, demonstrating that Superfund is genuinely 
a national program.  The highest proportion of sites is in the Northeast and Midwest (i.e., the “Rust 
Belt”), reflecting the historical concentration of heavy industry in these regions.   
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 Figures 3A and 3B present the geographic distribution of the 487 sites with complete house price 
data in the 1982 HRS Sample.  Figure 3A (3B) displays the distribution of sites with 1982 HRS scores 
exceeding (below) 28.5.  The sites in both categories are spread throughout the United States, but the 
below 28.5 sites are in fewer states.  For example, there are not any below 28.5 sites in Minnesota, 
Florida, and Delaware.  The unequal distributions of sites across the country pose a problem for 
identification in the presence of localized housing market shocks.  To mitigate the influence of these 
shocks, we emphasize econometric models for changes in housing prices that include state fixed effects. 
Figure 4 presents a histogram of the initial HRS scores where the bins are 4 HRS points wide, 
among the 487 sites in the 1982 HRS Sample.  Notably, the EPA considered HRS scores within 4 points 
to be statistically indistinguishable and reflect comparable risks to human health (EPA 1991).  The 
distribution looks approximately normal, with the modal bin covering the 36.5-40.5 range.  Further, there 
isn’t obvious bunching just above or below the threshold, which supports the scientific validity of the 
HRS scores and suggests that they weren’t manipulated.  Importantly, 227 sites have HRS scores between 
16.5 and 40.5.  This set is centered on the regulatory threshold of 28.5 that determines placement on the 
NPL and constitutes the regression discontinuity sample that we exploit in the subsequent analysis. 
 
IV. Econometric Methods 
A. Least Squares Estimation with Data from the Entire U.S. 
 Here, we discuss a conventional econometric approach to estimating the relationship between 
housing prices and NPL listing.  This approach is laid out in the following system of equations:  
(6) yc2000 = θ 1(NPLc2000) + Xc1980′β +  εc2000,   
(7) 1(NPLc2000) = Xc1980′Π + ηc2000,    
where yc2000 is the log of the median property value in census tract c in 2000.  The indicator 
variable 1(NPLc2000) equals 1 only for observations from census tracts that contain (or areas near) a 
hazardous waste site that has been placed on the NPL by 2000.  Thus, this variable takes on a value of 1 
for any of the Superfund sites in column (1) of Table 1, not just those that were on the initial NPL.  The 
vector Xc1980 includes determinants of housing prices measured in 1980, which may also determine NPL 
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status.  εc2000 and ηc2000 are the unobservable determinants of housing prices and NPL status, respectively.   
A few features of the X vector are noteworthy.  First, we restrict this vector to 1980 values of the 
variables to avoid confounding the effect of NPL status with “post-treatment” changes in these variables 
that may be due to NPL status.  Second, we include the 1980 value of the dependent variable, yc80 in 
Xc1980, to adjust for permanent differences in housing prices across tracts and the possibility of mean 
reversion in housing prices.   Third, to account for local housing market shocks, we emphasize results 
from specifications that include a full set of state fixed effects. 
Fourth, in many applied hedonic papers, the vector of controls is limited to housing and 
neighborhood characteristics (e.g., number of bedrooms, school quality, and air quality).  Income and 
other similar variables are generally excluded on the grounds that they are “demand shifters” and are 
needed to identify the bid function.  However, this exclusion restriction is invalid if individuals treat 
wealthy neighbors as an amenity, which seems likely.  In the subsequent analysis, we are agnostic about 
which variables belong in the X vector and report estimates that are adjusted for different combinations of 
the variables available in the Census data.  The Data Appendix lists the full set of covariates. 
The coefficient θ measures the effect of NPL status on 2000 property values, after controlling for 
1980 mean property values and the other covariates.  Specifically, it tests for differential housing price 
appreciation between census tracts with NPL sites and the rest of the country.  If there are unobserved 
determinants of housing prices that covary with NPL status, then the estimates of θ will be biased.  More 
formally, consistent estimation requires E[εc2000ηc2000] = 0.  Ultimately, this “conventional” approach 
places a lot of faith in the assumption that linear adjustment for the limited set of variables available in the 
Census removes all sources of confounding. 
 
B. A Quasi-Experimental Approach based on the 1982 HRS Research Design 
This subsection discusses our preferred identification strategy that has two key differences with 
the conventional one.  First, we limit the sample to the census tracts containing the 487 sites in the 1982 
HRS Sample with complete housing price data.  Thus, all observations are from tracts with sites that the 
EPA judged to be among the nation’s most dangerous in 1982.  If, for example, the β’s differ across tracts 
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with and without hazardous waste sites or there are differential trends in housing prices in tracts with and 
without these sites, then this approach is more likely to produce consistent estimates.  Second, we use an 
instrumental variables (IV) strategy to account for the possibility of endogenous rescoring of sites. 
More formally, we replace equation (7) with: 
(8) 1(NPLc2000) = Xc1980′Π + δ 1(HRSc82 > 28.5) + ηc2000, 
where 1(HRSc82 > 28.5) serves as an instrumental variable.  This indicator function equals 1 for census 
tracts with a site that has a 1982 HRS score exceeding the 28.5 threshold.  We then substitute the 
predicted value of 1(NPLc2000) from the estimation of equation (8) in the fitting of (6) to obtain an 
estimate of θIV.  In this IV framework, θIV is identified from the variation in NPL status that is due to a 
site having a 1982 HRS score exceeding 28.5. 
For θIV to provide a consistent estimate of the HPS gradient, the instrumental variable must affect 
the probability of NPL listing without having a direct effect on housing prices.  The next section will 
demonstrate that the first condition clearly holds.  The second condition requires that the unobserved 
determinants of 2000 housing prices are orthogonal to the portion of the nonlinear function of the 1982 
HRS score that is not explained by Xc1980.  In the simplest case, the IV estimator is consistent if 
E[1(HRSc82 > 28.5) εc2000] = 0.     
We also exploit the regression discontinuity design implicit in the 1(•) function that determines 
NPL eligibility in three separate ways to obtain IV estimates that allow for the possibility that E[1(HRSc82 
> 28.5) εc2000] ≠ 0 over the entire 1982 HRS Sample.  In the first, a quadratic in the 1982 HRS score is 
included in Xc1980 to partial out any correlation between residual housing prices and the indicator for a 
1982 HRS score exceeding 28.5.  This approach relies on the plausible assumption that residual 
determinants of housing price growth do not change discontinuously at the regulatory threshold.  The 
second regression discontinuity approach involves implementing our IV estimator on the regression 
discontinuity sample of 227 sites with 1982 HRS scores between 16.5 and 40.5.  Here, the identifying 
assumption is that all else is held equal in the “neighborhood” of the regulatory threshold.  More formally, 
it is E[1(HRSc82 > 28.5) εc2000|16.5 < 1982 HRS < 40.5] = 0.   
Recall, the HRS score is a nonlinear function of the ground water, surface water, and air 
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migration pathway scores.  The third regression discontinuity method exploits knowledge of this function 
by including the individual pathway scores in the vector Xc1980.  All three regression discontinuity 
approaches are demanding of the data and this is reflected in higher sampling errors. 
 
V. Empirical Results 
A. Balancing of Observable Covariates 
 This subsection examines the comparisons that underlie the subsequent least squares and quasi-
experimental IV estimates of the effect of NPL status on housing price growth.  We begin by assessing 
whether NPL status and the 1(HRSc82 > 28.5) instrumental variable are orthogonal to the observable 
predictors of housing prices.  Formal tests for the presence of omitted variables bias are of course 
impossible, but it seems reasonable to presume that research designs that balance the observable 
covariates across NPL status or 1(HRSc82 > 28.5) may suffer from smaller omitted variables bias (Altonji, 
Elder, and Taber 2000).  Further, if the observables are balanced, consistent inference does not depend on 
functional form assumptions on the relations between observable covariates and housing prices. 
 Table 2 shows the association of NPL status and 1(HRSc82 > 28.5) with potential determinants of 
housing price growth measured in 1980.  Column (1) reports the means of the variables listed in the row 
headings in the 985 census tracts with NPL hazardous waste sites and complete housing price data.  
Column (2) displays the means in the 41,989 census tracts that neither contain a NPL site nor share a 
border with a tract containing one.  Columns (3) and (4) report on the means in the 181 and 306 census 
tracts with hazardous waste sites with 1982 HRS scores below and above the 28.5 threshold, respectively.  
Columns (5) and (6) repeat this exercise for the 90 and 137 tracts below and above the regulatory 
threshold in the regression discontinuity sample.  The remaining columns report p-values from tests that 
the means in pairs of the first six columns are equal.  P-values less than 0.01 are denoted in bold.   
Column (7) compares the means in columns (1) and (2) to explore the possibility of confounding 
in the least square approach.  The entries indicate that 1980 housing prices are more than 20% lower in 
tracts with a NPL site.  Moreover, the tracts with NPL sites have lower population densities, lower 
household incomes, and mobile homes account for a higher fraction of the housing stock (8.6% versus 
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4.7%).  Overall, the hypothesis of equal means can be rejected at the 1% level for 21 of the 27 potential 
determinants of housing prices.  Due to this confounding of NPL status, it may be reasonable to assume 
that least squares estimation of equation (6) will produce biased estimates of the effect of NPL status.   
Columns (8) and (9) compare all tracts with hazardous wastes that have 1982 HRS scores below 
and above the 28.5 regulatory threshold and those in the regression discontinuity sample, respectively.  It 
is immediately evident that by narrowing the focus to these tracts, the differences in the potential 
determinants of housing prices are greatly mitigated (see especially population density and percentage of 
mobile homes).  This is especially so in the regression discontinuity sample where the hypothesis of equal 
means cannot be rejected at the 3% level for any of the 27 variables.  Notably, the differences in the 
means are substantially reduced for many of the variables, so the higher p-values do not simply reflect the 
smaller samples (and larger sampling errors). 
One variable that remains a potential source of concern is 1980 housing prices.  The differences 
are greatly reduced in the 1982 HRS Sample, relative to columns (1) and (2), but they are not eliminated.  
However, Panel B of Table 4 in Greenstone and Gallagher (2005) demonstrates that these differences 
entirely disappear after adjustment for the 1980 housing, economic, and demographic variables.  
Nevertheless, we control for 1980 housing prices in the regressions for 2000 housing prices below.  
Overall, the entries suggest that the above and below 28.5 comparison, especially in the regression 
discontinuity sample, reduces the confounding of NPL status.  It is not a panacea, however, so we also 
adjust for observables. 
 
B. Least Squares Estimates of the Impact of Clean-ups on Property Values 
Table 3 presents the first ever large-scale effort to test the effect of Superfund clean-ups on 
property value appreciation rates.  Specifically, it reports the regression results from fitting 4 least squares 
versions of equation (6) for 2000 housing prices.  In Panel A, 985 observations are from census tracts that 
contain a hazardous waste site that had been on the NPL at any time prior to 2000.18  The remainder of the 
                                                     
18 The 985 NPL sites are located in 892 individual census tracts.  In the regressions, observations on tracts that 
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sample is comprised of the 41,989 observations on the tracts with complete housing price data that neither 
have a NPL site nor are adjacent to a tract with a NPL site.   
The remaining Panels use slightly different samples.  In Panel B, the observations from each tract 
with a NPL site in the Panel A sample are replaced with the observations based on the 3-mile radius 
circles around the NPL sites.  Panels C and D are identical to A and B, except that the set of NPL sites is 
limited to the hazardous waste sites in the 1982 HRS Sample that were ever on the NPL by January 1, 
2000.  These last two panels are included so that they can be compared to the subsequent quasi-
experimental results. 
The entries report the coefficient and heteroskedastic-consistent standard error on the NPL 
indicator.  All specifications control for the natural log of the mean housing price in 1980, so the reported 
parameter should be interpreted as the growth in housing prices in areas near a NPL site, relative to the 
rest of the country.  The exact covariates in each specification are noted in the row headings at the bottom 
of the table and are described in more detail in the Data Appendix.    
 The Panel A results show that this least squares approach finds a positive association between 
NPL listing and housing price increases in the sites’ tracts between 1980 and 2000.  Specifically, the 
estimates in the first row indicate that median housing prices grew by 4.0% to 7.3% (measured in ln 
points) more in tracts with a site placed on the NPL.  All of these estimates would easily be judged 
statistically significant by conventional criteria.  The column (4) estimate of 6.7% is the most reliable one, 
because it is adjusted for all unobserved state-level determinants of housing price growth.   
Panel B explores the growth of housing prices within 3 miles of the NPL sites to summarize the 
total gain in housing prices.  We report p-values from tests that the coefficients on the NPL indicator are 
large enough so that Superfund clean-ups pass a cost-benefit test based on the assumption that the benefits 
are entirely reflected in local housing prices.  As discussed in Section II, this is equivalent to assuming 
that there is a perfectly inelastic supply curve.  (It also assumes that all program benefits occur in the local 
housing market.)  In this sample, the 1980 aggregate value of the housing stock is $874 million and the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
include multiple NPL sites have a weight equal to the square root of the number of sites. 
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mean cost of a clean-up is $39 million, so we test whether the change in housing prices exceeds 4.5%.   
All of the estimates are statistically different from zero and imply that the placement of a site on 
the NPL is associated with a substantial increase in housing prices within three miles of the site.  The 
column (4) specification indicates a precisely estimated gain in prices of 10.6%.  The null that the clean-
ups pass this cost-benefit test cannot be rejected in any of the specifications.      
The own census tract results in Panel C are similar to those in A.  The 3-mile radius circle results 
in D indicate large increases in housing prices, like those in Panel B.  The point estimates from the richer 
specifications are about twice as large as those in B, and, if taken literally, all of the estimates also 
indicate that Superfund passes this cost-benefit test.   
Before drawing any definitive conclusions or policy implications, however, it is worth 
emphasizing that three features of the evidence presented so far suggest that the Table 3 estimates may be 
unreliable.  First, Table 2 demonstrated that NPL status is confounded by many variables.  Second, 6 of 
the 8 3-mile radius sample point estimates exceed the own census tract estimates.  This seems suspicious, 
because it seems reasonable to expect the impact on housing prices to be greater closer to the sites, 
especially in light of their relatively small size (recall, the median size is less than 30 acres).  Third, the 
point estimates from the 3-mile samples are unstable across specifications, so the exact choice of controls 
plays a large role in any conclusions.  For example, in Panel D, the implied increase in housing prices 
ranges from 4.6% to 23.2%.19      
 
C. Quasi-Experimental Estimates of NPL Status on Housing Prices from the 1982 HRS Sample 
We now turn to the preferred quasi-experimental approach and begin by assessing the 
relationship between 1982 HRS scores and NPL status.  Figure 5 plots the bivariate relation between the 
probability that a site was placed on the NPL by 2000 and its initial HRS score among the 487 sites in the 
                                                     
19 It is also noteworthy that the point estimate on the NPL indicator is quite sensitive to the choice of functional form 
for two controls: the number of housing units and number of owner occupied units in both Panels B and D.  This 
likely reflects the fact that the values of these variables differ substantially between the observations on the 3-mile 
circles and the census tracts.  It also underscores the importance of unverifiable functional form assumptions when 
the variables are not balanced across the areas with and without NPL sites. 
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1982 HRS Sample.  The plots are done separately for sites above and below the 28.5 threshold and come 
from the estimation of nonparametric regressions that use Cleveland’s (1979) tricube weighting function 
and a bandwidth of 0.5.20  Thus, they represent a moving average of the probability of NPL status across 
1982 HRS scores.  The data points represent the mean probabilities in the same 4-unit intervals of the 
HRS score as in Figure 4. 
The figure presents dramatic evidence that an initial HRS score above 28.5 is a strong predictor 
of NPL status.  Virtually all sites with initial scores greater than 28.5 were placed on the NPL by 2000.  
Again, rescoring explains the nonzero probability of placement on the NPL by 2000 among sites with an 
initial score below 28.5.  A statistical version of the figure reveals that a HRS score above 28.5 is 
associated with an 83% increase in the probability of placement on the NPL (Greenstone and Gallagher 
2005).  It is evident that there is a powerful first-stage relationship 
Table 4 presents IV estimates of the effect of NPL status on housing prices in 2000.  In Panel A, 
the observations are from the census tracts containing the 487 hazardous waste sites in the 1982 HRS 
Sample.  In Panel B, each observation is comprised of the average of all variables across tracts that share 
a border with these tracts.  In Panels C and D, the sample is comprised of the land area within circles with 
radii of 2 and 3 miles that are centered at each site’s longitude and latitude.  The means of the 1980 values 
of the total housing stock in the four samples are $71, $525, $349, and $796 million, respectively.     
The controls in the first four columns are identical to those in the four specifications in Table 3.  
In the fifth column, the 1982 HRS score and its square are added to the column (4) specification.  In 
column (6), the controls are the same as in column (4), but the sample is the regression discontinuity 
sample that is comprised of the 227 sites with 1982 HRS scores between 16.5 and 40.5.  The sample and 
specification details are noted in the row headings at the bottom of the table.    
The Panel A results suggest that a site’s placement on the NPL has little impact on the growth of 
property values in its own census tract, relative to tracts with sites that narrowly missed placement on the 
                                                     
20 The smoothed scatterplots are qualitatively similar with a rectangular weighting function (i.e., equal weighting) 
and alternative bandwidths. 
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NPL.  The point estimates indicate an increase in prices that ranges from 0.7% to 5.6%, but they all have 
associated t-statistics less than two.  The regression discontinuity specifications in columns (5) and (6) 
may be the most credible, so it is notable that they produce the smallest point estimates (although they are 
also the least precise).   
Panel B presents the adjacent tract results.  The point estimates from the most reliable 
specifications in columns (4) – (6) range between -0.6% and 1.5% and zero cannot be rejected at 
conventional levels for any of them.  Thus, there is little evidence of meaningful gains in housing prices 
outside the site’s own census tract.   
 Panels C and D summarize the total gain in housing prices associated with a site’s placement on 
the NPL by using the 2- and 3-mile radius circle samples.  They also report whether the clean-ups pass 
cost-benefit tests analogous to those in Table 3.  The threshold housing price gains are 12.3% and 5.4%.   
 The circle sample results provide further evidence that the NPL designation has little effect on 
housing prices.  In the columns (4) – (6) specifications, the point estimates all imply price increases 
smaller than 2%.  Further in all six of the 2-mile specifications and the most reliable 3-mile ones, the null 
that the gain in housing prices exceeds the break-even threshold is rejected at conventional significance 
levels.  Overall, these quasi-experimental estimates suggest that Superfund clean-ups fail to pass this cost-
benefit test.  This finding further undermines the credibility of the results from the conventional approach 
that suggested that the benefits substantially exceeded the costs. 
Figure 6 provides an opportunity to better understand the source of these regression results.  It 
plots the nonparametric regressions of 2000 residual housing prices (after adjustment for the column (4) 
covariates) against the 1982 HRS score in the 2-mile radius sample.21  The nonparametric regression is 
estimated separately below (dark line) and above (light line) the 28.5 threshold.  The graph confirms that 
there is little association between 2000 residual housing prices and the 1982 HRS score.  A comparison of 
                                                     
21 Figure 6 provides a qualitative graphical exploration of the regression results.  The relationship between housing 
prices and 1982 HRS scores cannot be exactly inferred from this graph, because the HRS score has not been 
adjusted for the column (4) covariates.  This same caveat applies to Figure 7.  However, the meaningfulness of this 
graph is supported by Table 2’s finding that the covariates are well balanced among sites with 1982 HRS scores 
above and below the regulatory threshold, especially near the regulatory threshold.   
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the plots at the regulatory threshold is of especial interest in light of the large jump in the probability of 
placement on the NPL there.  It is apparent that the moving averages from the left and right are virtually 
equal at the threshold. 
Table 5 presents the results from a series of specification checks, all of which are fit on the 2-mile 
radius circle sample.  For conciseness, we only present estimates from the column (1) specification and 
the three most robust specifications (i.e., columns 4, 5, and 6) from Table 4.   
Panel A reports the results from the third regression discontinuity style approach, which adds the 
individual pathway scores to the vector Xc1980 of controls in all four specifications.  Panel B adds the 2000 
values of the controls as separate covariates.  These variables may be affected by the clean-ups so they 
may be endogenous.  To isolate the effect of NPL status on land values (rather than housing values), 
however, it may be appropriate to adjust for these variables.  In Panel C, the dependent variable is the ln 
of the 1990 (rather than 2000) median house value and NPL status is also measured as of 1990.  Taken 
together, these specifications provide further support for the Table 4 finding that the NPL designation has 
little effect on the growth of property values. 
Panel D tests whether the effect of the NPL designation differs in the 2-mile circles with a 
population density exceeding 4,053 per square mile, which is the top quartile among tracts in this 
sample.22  The intuition is that the price response to clean-ups may be greater in higher density areas 
where there are fewer undeveloped plots of land to build new houses.23  Specifically, the specification 
now includes an indicator for these tracts and the additional variable of interest, which is the interaction of 
this indicator and the indicator for 2000 NPL status.  The latter variable is treated as endogenous and 
instrumented with the interaction of indicators for tract population density exceeding 4,053 and sites with 
a HRS score exceeding 28.5.   All of the estimates of the interaction are negative, and none would be 
judged to be statistically different from zero.  It seems that the absence of a price effect is not due to an 
abundance of undeveloped plots of land, although we directly estimate supply responses below.   
                                                     
22 Of the sites in the 122 tracts with a population density exceeding 4,053, 63 have a HRS score exceeding 28.5 and 
70 have sites placed on the NPL by 2000.   
23 Notably, Davis (2004) finds a 13% house price response to the outbreak of a cancer cluster in Churchill County, 
Nevada, which has a population density of just 5 people per square mile.      
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We conducted a number of other specification checks.  These included using the ln of the mean 
(rather than the median) house price as the dependent variable, using a fixed effects style approach where 
the difference between the lns of 2000 and 1980 house prices is the dependent variable (rather than 
controlling for 1980 ln prices), controlling for the fraction of census tracts within the 2-mile circles with a 
boundary change between 1980 and 2000, and adding the 1970 values of the controls (including the ln of 
1970 housing prices) as separate covariates to adjust for mean reversion or pre-existing trends in the 
subsample where these variable are available.  These specification checks all lead to the same qualitative 
finding that a site’s addition to the NPL has little effect on the growth of nearby housing prices nearly 20 
years later.24 25
 
D. Quasi-Experimental Estimates of Stages of Superfund Clean-Ups on Rental Rates 
We now turn to using the ln median rental rates as the outcome variable.  Rental units account for 
roughly 20% of all housing units and generally differ on observable characteristics from owner occupied 
homes.  This outcome’s appeal is that rental rates are a measure of the current value of housing services, 
so it is possible to abstract from the problem with the housing price outcome that individuals’ 
expectations about time until the completion of the clean-up are unknown.  Further, we can test whether 
the impact on the value of local housing services varies at different stages of Superfund clean-ups. 
Table 6 presents separate estimates of the effect of the different stages of the remediation process 
on the ln median rental rate.  We stack equations for 1990 and 2000 ln rental rates, so there are two 
observations per county.  The 1980 housing characteristics variables are calculated across rental units, 
                                                     
24 The own census tract sample regression results for some of these specification checks are presented in Greenstone 
and Gallagher (2005).  That version of the paper also reports on a test of whether there was greater housing price 
appreciation near sites where the groundwater was heavily contaminated and residents use well water for drinking.  
We assumed that clean-ups would be highly valued in these areas, however this test also failed to find significant 
evidence of differential house price appreciation in these areas (see Greenstone and Gallagher 2005).  Additionally, 
we would have liked to test whether the effects of clean-ups differed for large sites or ones where the estimated costs 
of clean-up are high (so called “mega” sites) but the size and estimated cost data are only available for NPL sites. 
25 Probst and Konisky (2001) find that approximately 14.5% of RODs ultimately receive a “no further action” 
classification when removal activities were sufficient to remove the environmental risk and/or the risk naturally 
dissipated.  There are eleven sites in the 1982 HRS Sample where all RODs received the “no further action” 
classification so no remediation activities took place at them.  The regression results are virtually identical to those 
presented in Table 4 when the observations from near these sites are dropped. 
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rather than across owner occupied units as in the above analysis of housing prices.  The effects of all of 
the controls listed in the row headings are allowed to differ in 1990 and 2000.   
The indicator variable for NPL status is replaced by three independent indicator variables.  They 
are equal to 1 for sites that by 1990 or 2000 were: placed on the NPL but no ROD had been issued; issued 
a ROD but were not completely remediated; and “construction complete” or deleted from the NPL, 
respectively.  The instruments are the interactions of the indicator for a 1982 HRS score above 28.5 and 
these three independent indicators.  The table reports the point estimates and their standard errors, which 
allow for clustering at the site level, along with the p-value from an F-test that the three point estimates 
are equal.  The number of sites in each category and the mean HRS score is also listed in brackets.   
There is some evidence that higher voter turnout and per capita income are associated with the 
speed through which a site moves through the clean-up process and the stringency of clean-ups (Gupta et 
al., 1995 and 1996; Viscusi and Hamilton 1999; Sigman 2001).  Consequently, the two stage least squares 
strategy is unlikely to purge these sources of endogeneity, so it is appropriate to consider these three 
parameter estimates associational or descriptive. 
There are a few important findings.  First, sites in the “NPL Only” category have been on the 
NPL for either 7 or 17 years, but the EPA has not developed a remediation plan for them yet.  The 
estimates from the more reliable specifications suggest that there is little effect on rental rates near these 
sites.  This finding undermines a key feature of the popular “stigma” hypothesis that a site’s placement on 
the NPL leads to an immediate reduction in the value of housing services near the site as nearby residents 
revise upwards their expectation of the risk they face from the site.26  Second, in the more reliable 
specifications, the point estimates for the “Construction Complete or NPL Deletion” category are all 
negative, and zero cannot be rejected for any of them.  This finding is telling, because these sites have 
been fully remediated and yet there is little effect on rental rates.   
                                                     
26 The stigma hypothesis states that a site’s placement on the NPL causes nearby residents to revise their expectation 
of a site’s health risk upwards permanently so that the value of nearby housing services declines relative to before its 
listing on the NPL, even after remediation is completed.  Harris (1999) reviews the stigma literature and McCluskey 
and Rausser (2003) and Messer, Schulze, Hackett, Cameron, and McClelland (2004) are case studies that present 
evidence that prices decline immediately after the announcement that a local site has been placed on the NPL.  
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Third, the null that the three parameter estimates are equal cannot be rejected in any of the 
specifications.  This result demonstrates that the approximately zero effect on housing prices is not due to 
the averaging of a positive effect at fully remediated sites and a negative effect at sites where remediation 
is incomplete or hasn’t been initiated.  Overall, these results are consistent with the housing price findings 
that Superfund clean-ups have small effects on the value of local housing services. 
 
E. Quasi-Experimental Estimates of the Effect of NPL Status on Demand Shifters 
If consumers value Superfund clean-ups, then the clean-ups should lead to migration, so that by 
2000 the population near NPL sites is comprised of individuals that place a higher value on environmental 
quality.  Table 7 tests whether there were changes in the income and wealth (i.e., education) of residents, 
demand shifters measured by demographic characteristic of residents, and total population near NPL sites, 
respectively.  The entries report the parameter estimate and standard error on the dummy for NPL status 
from four specifications.  The row headings provide specification details. 
The estimated impacts of the NPL designation on the measures of income and wealth are 
inconsistent across specifications and imprecisely estimated.  We had hypothesized that families with 
children would be more willing to live in these areas after the clean-ups.  However, Panel B fails to 
provide any meaningful evidence that the NPL designation leads to changes in the demographic demand 
shifter (and racial justice) outcomes.  Finally, the instability of the point estimates across specifications in 
Panel C suggests that there is little effect on total population.   
Notably, this table’s qualitative findings are unchanged by the inclusion of 1980 housing prices 
and housing characteristics as covariates.  Overall, there is little evidence that the NPL designation is 
associated with changes in variables that proxy for shifts in demand for environmental quality.   
 
F. Quasi-Experimental Estimates of the Effect of NPL Status on Supply 
An increase in the supply of housing units in the vicinity of a NPL site would provide evidence 
that Superfund clean-ups increase the value of the surrounding land.  In Table 8, we test this possibility 
with the 2- and 3-mile radius samples, using the same four specifications from Tables 5 and 6.  These 
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results are also inconsistent across specifications.  The most reasonable conclusion is that the assignment 
of the NPL designation has little effect on the supply of housing.  Figure 7 plots nonparametric 
regressions of 2000 residual housing units after adjustment for the column (2) covariates from the 2 mile 
radius sample.  There is little evidence of an increase in housing units near sites with initial HRS scores 
that exceed 28.5, especially at the regulatory threshold.  
 
VI. Interpretation and Policy Implications 
 This paper has shown that across a wide range of housing market outcomes, there is little 
evidence that Superfund clean-ups increase social welfare substantially.  In light of the significant 
resources devoted to these clean-ups and the claims of large health benefits, this finding is surprising.  
This section reviews three possible explanations. 
 First, the individuals that choose to live near these sites before and after the clean-ups may have a 
low willingness to pay to avoid exposure to hazardous waste sites.  In this case, society provides these 
individuals a good that they don’t value highly.  It is possible (and perhaps likely) that there are segments 
of the population with a high WTP to avoid exposure to hazardous waste sites.  It may even be the case 
that the population average WTP is substantial.  However, the policy relevant parameter is the WTP of 
the population that lives near these sites, and this is the parameter that the paper has estimated.27  
 Second, scientific has not found decisive evidence of substantial health benefits from the clean-
ups of hazardous waste sites (Vrijheid 2000; Currie, Greenstone and Moretti 2006).  Consequently, 
consumers believe that the reductions in risk are small and rationally place a low value on them.  Of 
course, the discovery of large health improvements in the future could cause consumers to increase their 
valuations of the clean-ups.28
Third, the sites with initial HRS scores less than 28.5 also received complete remediations under 
                                                     
27 A popular theory is that sites become permanently stigmatized when they are placed on the NPL.  Recall, the 
rental rate results in Section V D are inconsistent with this theory and would lead to a rejection of this hypothesis. 
28  Another possibility is that consumers are imperfectly informed about the location of Superfund sites and their 
clean-ups.  We think this is unlikely, because local media often devote extensive coverage to local Superfund sites 
and their clean-ups.  Further, at least a few states (e.g., Alaska and Arizona) require home sellers to disclose whether 
there are hazardous waste sites in close proximity. 
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state or local land reclamation programs.  In this case, a zero result is to be expected since both the above 
and below 28.5 sites would have received the same treatment.  We investigated this possibility by 
conducting an extensive search for information on remediation activities at these sites.29
 From these investigations, we concluded that the clean-up activities were dramatically more 
ambitious and costly at sites with initial scores exceeding 28.5.  For example, we were unable to find 
evidence of any remediation activities by 2000 at roughly 60% of the sites with scores below 28.5.  
Further, among the 40% of the sites where there was evidence of clean-up efforts, the average expenditure 
was roughly $3 million.  This is about $40 million less than our estimate of the average cost of a 
Superfund clean-up.  This difference is not surprising, because the state and local clean-ups were often 
limited to restricting access to the site or containing the toxics, rather than trying to achieve Superfund’s 
goal of returning the site to its “natural state.”  Nevertheless, some remediation took place at these sites, 
so it may be appropriate to interpret the results as the impact of the extra $40 million that a Superfund 
clean-up costs. 
In our view, the most likely explanations are that the people that choose to live near these sites 
don’t value the clean-ups or that consumers have little reason to believe that the clean-ups substantially 
reduce health risks.  In either case the results mean that given the current state of knowledge, local 
residents’ gain in welfare from Superfund clean-ups falls well short of the costs.  The implication is that 
less ambitious operations like the erection of fences, posting of warning signs around the sites, and simple 
containment of toxics might be a more efficient use of resources. 
This paper has provided an important piece of what would constitute a full accounting of 
Superfund’s benefits.  It is possible that there are other benefits of these clean-ups that are not captured in 
the local housing market, including health and aesthetic benefits to individuals that do not live in close 
proximity to Superfund sites, reductions in injuries to ecological systems, and protection of ground water.  
                                                     
29 Specifically, we filed freedom of information act requests with the EPA for information on these sites and 
followed any leads from these documents.  We also searched the Superfund web site and the sites of state 
departments of environmental quality and used internet search engines.  Additionally, we contacted national and 
regional EPA personnel and state and local environmental officials.  Although we expended considerable effort in 
these searches, there is no centralized database about these sites so we cannot be certain that further efforts wouldn’t 
turn up different information.  
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Further, the discovery of compelling evidence of health benefits might cause local residents to increase 
their valuations, and this would presumably be reflected in the housing market.   
 
VII. Conclusions 
This study has used the housing market to develop estimates of the local welfare impacts of 
Superfund sponsored clean-ups of hazardous waste sites.  The basis of the analysis is a comparison of 
housing market outcomes in the areas surrounding the first 400 hazardous waste sites chosen for 
Superfund clean-ups to the areas surrounding the 290 sites that narrowly missed qualifying for these 
clean-ups.  We find that Superfund clean-ups are associated with economically small and statistically 
indistinguishable from zero local changes in residential property values, property rental rates, housing 
supply, total population, and the types of individuals living near the sites.  These findings are robust to a 
series of specification checks, including the application of a quasi-experimental regression discontinuity 
design based on knowledge of the selection rule.  Overall, the preferred estimates suggest that the local 
benefits of Superfund clean-ups are small and appear to be substantially lower than the $43 million mean 
cost of Superfund clean-ups. 
More broadly, this paper makes two contributions.  First, it models the consequences of a quasi-
experiment that improves a local amenity in the context of the hedonic model.  The key theoretical 
findings are that if consumers value the amenity, then there will be increases in local housing prices and 
new home construction.  Further, there will be taste-based sorting such that individuals that place a high 
value on the amenity will move to areas where they can consume it.  Second, it contributes to a growing 
body of research (Black 1999; Chay and Greenstone 2005) demonstrating that it is possible to identify 
research designs that mitigate the confounding that has historically undermined the credibility of 
conventional hedonic approaches to valuing non-market goods.   
Perhaps most importantly, this paper has demonstrated that the combination of quasi-experiments 
and hedonic theory are a powerful method to use markets to value environmental and other non-market 
goods.   
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DATA APPENDIX
 
This data appendix provides information on a number of aspects of the data set that we compiled to 
conduct the analysis for this paper.  Due to space constraints, this is an abridged version of the data 
appendix that is available in Greenstone and Gallagher (2005).  The longer data appendix includes details 
on the variables on: the size of the hazardous waste sites; whether a site has achieved the construction 
complete designation; and the determination of expected and actual remediation costs.  It also includes a 
discussion of how we placed hazardous waste sites in 2000 Census tracts and a lengthier discussion on the 
1982 HRS sample. 
 
I. Covariates in Housing Price and Rental Rate Regressions 
 
The following are the control variables used in the housing price and rental rate regressions.  They are 
listed by the categories indicated in the row headings at the bottom of these tables.  All of the variables 
are measured in 1980 and are measured at the census tract level (or are the mean across sets of census 
tracts, for example tracts that share a border with a tract containing a hazardous waste site). 
 
1980 Ln House Price 
ln mean value of owner occupied housing units in 1980 (note: the median is unavailable in 1980) 
 
1980 Housing Characteristics 
total housing units (rental and owner occupied) 
% of total housing units (rental and owner occupied) that are occupied 
total housing units owner occupied 
% of owner occupied housing units with 0 bedrooms 
% of owner occupied housing units with 1 bedroom 
% of owner occupied housing units with 2 bedrooms 
% of owner occupied housing units with 3 bedrooms 
% of owner occupied housing units with 4 bedrooms 
% of owner occupied housing units with 5 or more bedrooms 
% of owner occupied housing units that are detached 
% of owner occupied housing units that are attached 
% of owner occupied housing units that are mobile homes 
% of owner occupied housing units built within last year 
% of owner occupied housing units built 2 to 5 years ago 
% of owner occupied housing units built 6 to 10 years ago 
% of owner occupied housing units built 10 to 20 years ago 
% of owner occupied housing units built 20 to 30 years ago 
% of owner occupied housing units built 30 to 40 years ago 
% of owner occupied housing units built more than 40 years ago 
% of all housing units without a full kitchen 
% of all housing units that have no heating or rely on a fire, stove, or portable heater 
% of all housing units without air conditioning 
% of all housing units without a full bathroom 
 
Note: In the rental regressions in Table 6, the owner occupied variables are replaced with renter occupied 
versions of the variables.  For example, the first variable is replaced with the “% of renter occupied 
housing units with 0 bedrooms.” 
 
1980 Economic Conditions 
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mean household income 
% of households with income below poverty line 
unemployment rate 
% of households that receive some form of public assistance 
 
1980 Demographics
population density 
% of population Black 
% of population Hispanic 
% of population under age 18 
% of population 65 or older 
% of population foreign born 
% of households headed by females 
% of households residing in same house as 5 years ago 
% of individuals aged 16-19 that are high school drop outs 
% of population over 25 that failed to complete high school  
% of population over 25 that have a BA or better (i.e., at least 16 years of education) 
 
II. Assignment of HRS Scores and their Role in the Determination of the NPL 
 The HRS test scores each pathway from 0 to 100, where higher scores indicate greater risk.30  The 
individual pathway scores are calculated using a method that considers characteristics of the site as being 
included in one of three categories: waste characteristics, likelihood of release, and target characteristics.  
The final pathway score is a multiplicative function of the scores in these three categories.  The logic is, 
for example, that if twice as many people are thought to be affected via a pathway then the pathway score 
should be twice as large. 
The final HRS score is calculated using the following equation: 
(1) HRS Score  = [(S2gw + S2sw + S2a) / 3] ½, 
where Sgw, Ssw, and Sa, denote the ground water migration, surface water migration, and air migration 
pathway scores, respectively.31  As equation (1) indicates, the final score is the square root of the average 
of the squared individual pathway scores.  It is evident that the effect of an individual pathway on the total 
HRS score is proportional to the pathway score.     
It is important to note that HRS scores can’t be interpreted as strict cardinal measures of risk.  A 
number of EPA studies have tested how well the HRS represents the underlying risk levels based on 
cancer and non-cancer risks.32  The EPA has concluded that the HRS test (at least from the late 1980s 
version) is an ordinal test but sites with scores within 4 points of each pose roughly comparable risks to 
human health (EPA 1991).33  
From 1982-1995, the EPA assigned all hazardous waste sites with a HRS score of 28.5 or greater 
to the NPL.  Additionally, the original legislation gave every state the right to place one site on the NPL 
without the site having to score at or above 28.5 on the HRS test.  As of 2003, 38 states have used their 
                                                     
30 The capping of individual pathways and of attributes within each pathway is one limiting characteristic of the test.  
There is a maximum value for most scores within each pathway category.  Also, if the final pathway score is greater 
than 100 then this score is reduced to 100.  The capping of individual pathways creates a loss of precision of the test 
since all pathway scores of 100 have the same effect on the final HRS score but may represent different magnitudes 
of risk.  See the EPA’s Hazard Ranking System Guidance Manual for further details on the determination of the 
HRS score.   
31 In 1990, the EPA revised the HRS test so that it also considers soil as an additional pathway. 
32 See Brody (1998) for a list of EPA studies that have examined this issue.  
33 The EPA states that the early 1980s version of the HRS test should not be viewed as a measure of “absolute risk”, 
but that “the HRS does distinguish relative risks among sites and does identify sites that appear to present a 
significant risk to public health, welfare, or the environment” (Federal Register 1984). 
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exception.  It is unknown whether these sites would have received a HRS score above 28.5.  Six of these 
“state priority sites” were included on the original NPL released in 1983, but due to their missing HRS 
scores these six sites are excluded from this paper’s analysis. 
In 1995 the criteria for placement on the NPL were altered so that a site must have a HRS score 
greater than 28.5 and the governor of the state in which the site is located must approve the placement.  
There are currently a number of potential NPL sites with HRS scores greater than 28.5 that have not been 
proposed for NPL placement due to known state political opposition.  We do not know the precise 
number of these sites because our Freedom of Information Act request for information about these sites 
was denied by the EPA. 
 
III. Primary Samples of Hazardous Waste Sites 
 The paper relies on two primary samples of hazardous waste sites, which we label the “All NPL 
Sample” and the “1982 HRS Sample.”   
 
A. All NPL Sample  
 The All NPL sample includes NPL sites located in the 50 US states and the District of Columbia 
that were placed on the NPL before January 1, 2000.  Although there are NPL sites located in US 
territories such as Puerto Rico, they are not included in the sample because the census data from these 
areas differs from the data for the remainder of the country.  Further, the sample is limited to sites that 
were listed on the NPL before January 1, 2000 to ensure that site listing occurred before any data 
collection for the 2000 census.  There are 1,398 sites in this sample. 
 
B. 1982 HRS Sample 
The second sample consists of the 690 sites that were tested between 1980 and 1982 for inclusion 
on the initial National Priority List announced on September 8, 1983.  In this sample, sites that received a 
HRS scored exceeding 28.5 were placed on the NPL.  See Greenstone and Gallagher (2005) for a more 
extensive discussion about some of the details surrounding the first NPL and this sample, more generally. 
 
IV. Matching of 2000 Census Tracts to 1980 and 1990 Censuses 
 The census tract is used as the unit of analysis, because it is the smallest aggregation of data that 
is available in the 1980, 1990 and 2000 US Census.  As noted in the text, year 2000 census tract 
boundaries are fixed so that the size and location of the census tract is the same for the 1980 and 1990 
census data.  The fixed census tract data boundaries were provided by Geolytics, a private company.  
Information on how the 1980 and 1990 census tracts were adjusted to fit the 2000 census tract boundaries 
can be found on their website at: www.geolytics.com.   
 An outline of their approach is as follows.  Geolytics mapped 1990 census tracts into 2000 census 
tracts using block level data.  Their documentation states, “The basic methodology was to use the smaller 
blocks to determine the population-weighted proportion of a 1990 tract that was later redefined as part of 
a 2000 tract.”34  A 1990 street coverage file was used to weight populations of 1990 blocks included in 
2000 census tracts when the 1990 blocks were split among multiple census tracts.  The assumption is that 
local streets and roads served as a proxy for where populations were located.  Block level data for 1980 
were unavailable.  This complicated the mapping of 1980 tracts into 1990 tracts.  However, the 
correspondence between 1980 tracts and 1990 blocks is “very good.”  As such “splitting a 1980 tract into 
1990 tracts had to be done spatially, meaning based solely on the 1990 block to 1980 tract 
correspondence.”35
 
                                                     
34 Appendix J: Description of Tract Remapping Methodology of Geolytics Data Users’ Guide for Neighborhood 
Change Database (1970-2000), page J3. 
35 Ibid, page J4. 
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V. Neighbor Samples 
 We use two approaches to define the set of houses outside each site’s tract that may be affected 
by the clean-up.  We refer to these sets of houses as “neighbors.” 
 The first approach defines the neighbors as all census tracts that share a border with the tract that 
contains the site.  GIS software was used to find each primary census tract and extract the identity of its 
adjacent neighbors.  In the 1982 HRS sample, the maximum number of neighboring census tracts is 21 
and the median is 7.  The population of each adjacent census tract was used to weight the housing price, 
housing characteristics, and demographic variables for each tract when calculating the mean adjacent 
neighbor values. 
 The second approach defines neighbors based on circles of varying radii around the exact location 
of the site.  GIS software is used to draw a circle around the point representing the site (generally the 
center of the site, but sometimes the point associated with the street address).  For example in the 1 mile 
sample, the GIS program draws circles with radii of 1 mile around each of the sites.  For a given site, data 
from all census tracts that fall within its 1-mile radius circle (including the tract containing the site) are 
used to calculate the mean housing values, housing and demographic characteristics, and economic 
variables.  To calculate these weighted means, each census tract within the circle is weighted by the 
product of its population and the portion of its total area that falls within the circle.  The maximum 
number of census tracts included in the 1 mile ring for a site is 37 and the mean and median are 3.9 and 3.  
For the 2 (3) mile ring the maximum number of neighbor sites is 80 (163), with a mean and median of 9.9 
and 8 (18.2 and 12). 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on the Superfund Program  
 All NPL Sites w/ 
non-Missing House 
Price Data 
1982 HRS Sites w/ 
non-Missing 
House Price Data  
1982 HRS Sites w/ 
Missing House 
Price Data 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Number of Sites 985 487 189 
1982 HRS Score Above 28.5 ------ 306 95 
A. Timing of Placement on NPL
Total 985 332 111 
# 1981-1985 406 312 97 
# 1986-1989 340 14 9 
# 1990-1994 166 4 3 
# 1995-1999 73 2 2 
B. HRS Information
Mean Scores | HRS > 28.5 41.89 44.47 43.23 
Mean Scores | HRS < 28.5 ----- 15.54 16.50 
C. Size of Site (in acres)
Number of sites with size data 920 310 97 
Mean (Median) 1,186 (29) 334 (25) 10,507 (35) 
Maximum 195,200 42,560 405,760 
D. Stages of Clean-Up for NPL Sites
Median Years from NPL Listing Until:   
ROD Issued ------ 4.3 4.3 
Clean-Up Initiated ------ 5.8 6.8 
Construction Complete ------ 12.1 11.5 
Deleted from NPL ------ 12.8 12.5 
1990 Status Among Sites NPL by 1990   
NPL Only 394 100 31 
ROD Issued or Clean-up Initiated 335 210 68 
Construction Complete or Deleted 22 16 7 
2000 Status Among Sites NPL by 2000   
NPL Only 137 15 3 
ROD Issued or Clean-up Initiated 370 119 33 
Construction Complete or Deleted 478 198 75 
E. Expected Costs of Remediation (Millions of 2000 $’s)
# Sites with Nonmissing Costs 753 293 95 
Mean (Median)  $28.3 ($11.0) $27.5 ($15.0) $29.6 ($11.5) 
95th Percentile  $89.6 $95.3 $146.0 
F. Actual and Expected Costs Conditional on Construction Complete (Millions of 2000 $’s)
Sites w/ Both Costs Nonmissing 477 203 69 
Mean (Median) Expected Costs $15.5 ($7.8) $20.6 ($9.7) $17.3 ($7.3) 
Mean (Median) Actual Costs $21.6 ($11.6) $32.0 ($16.2) $23.3 ($8.9) 
Notes: All dollar figures are in 2000 $’s.  Column (1) includes information for sites placed on the NPL before 
12/31/99.  The estimated cost information is calculated as the sum across the first Record of Decisions for each 
operating unit associated with a site.  See the Data Appendix for further details. 
  
Table 2: Mean Census Tract Characteristics by Categories of the 1982 HRS Score 
  NPL Site  No NPL Site HRS < 28.5 HRS > 28.5 HRS > 16.5 HRS > 28.5 P-Value P-Value P-Value 
 by 2000 by 2000   & < 28.5 & < 40.5 (1) vs. (2) (3) vs. (4) (5) vs. (6) 
           (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
# Census Tracts 985 41,989 181 306 90 137 ----- ----- ----- 
Superfund Clean-up Activities         
  
  
Ever NPL by 1990 0.7574 ----- 0.1271 0.9902 0.2222 0.9854 ----- 0.000 0.000
Ever NPL by 2000 1.0000 ----- 0.1602 0.9902 0.2667 0.9854 ----- 0.000 0.000
Housing Prices          
      
  
1980 Mean 58,045 69,904 45,027 52,137 46,135 50,648 0.000 0.000 0.084 
1990 Median 100,066 99,552 80,185 96,752 84,462 91,611 0.850 0.005 0.433 
2000 Median 139,041 151,712 115,479 135,436 117,528 123,503 0.000 0.001 0.449 
Housing Prices in Census Tracts that Share a Border with the Tracts Containing the Hazardous Waste Site    
1980 Mean 61,078 ----- 48,185 53,037 48,594 52,415 ----- 0.014 0.179 
1990 Median 100,840 ----- 84,624 94,324 86,982 85,950 ----- 0.053 0.879 
2000 Median 143,974 ----- 121,294 134,309 125,019 123,462 ----- 0.031 0.845 
1980 Housing Characteristics         
         
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Total Housing Units 1,392 1,350 1,357 1,353 1,367 1,319 0.039 0.951 0.575
% Mobile Homes 0.0862 0.0473 0.0813 0.0785 0.0944 0.0787 0.000 0.792 0.285
% Occupied 0.9408 0.9330 0.9408 0.9411 0.9412 0.9411 0.000 0.940 0.989
% Owner Occupied 0.6818 0.6125 0.6792 0.6800 0.6942 0.6730 0.000 0.959 0.344
% 0-2 Bedrooms 0.4484 0.4722 0.4691 0.4443 0.4671 0.4496 0.000 0.107 0.417
% 3-4 Bedrooms 0.5245 0.5016 0.5099 0.5288 0.5089 0.5199 0.000 0.202 0.586
% Built Last 5 Years 0.1434 0.1543 0.1185 0.1404 0.1366 0.1397 0.006 0.050 0.844
% Built Last 10 Years 0.2834 0.2874 0.2370 0.2814 0.2673 0.2758 0.506 0.012 0.723 
% No Air Conditioning 0.4903 0.4220 0.5058 0.4801 0.5157 0.5103 0.000 0.253 0.870
% with Zero Full Baths 0.0254 0.0229 0.0315 0.0259 0.0339 0.0290 0.011 0.089 0.386 
% Units Detached 0.8764 0.8773 0.8585 0.8908 0.8545 0.8897 0.868 0.050 0.107 
% Units Attached 0.0374 0.0754 0.0603 0.0307 0.0511 0.0317 0.000 0.040 0.297
1980 Demographics & Economic Characteristics       
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Population Density 1,407 5,786 1,670 1,157 1,361 1,151 0.000 0.067 0.570
% Black 0.0914 0.1207 0.1126 0.0713 0.0819 0.0844 0.000 0.037 0.926
% Hispanic 0.0515 0.0739 0.0443 0.0424 0.0309 0.0300 0.000 0.841 0.928
% Under 18 0.2939 0.2780 0.2932 0.2936 0.2885 0.2934 0.000 0.958 0.568
% Female Head HH 0.1616 0.1934 0.1879 0.1576 0.1639 0.1664 0.000 0.017 0.862
% Same House 5 Yrs Ago 0.5442 0.5127 0.6025 0.5623 0.5854 0.5655 0.000 0.001 0.244 
% > 25 No HS Diploma 0.3427 0.3144 0.4053 0.3429 0.3881 0.3533 0.000 0.000 0.060 
% > 25 BA or Better 0.1389 0.1767 0.1003 0.1377 0.1092 0.1343 0.000  
  
          
  
0.000 0.036 
% < Poverty Line 0.1056 0.1141 0.1139 0.1005 0.1072 0.1115 0.003 0.109 0.716
% Public Assistance 0.0736 0.0773 0.0885 0.0745 0.0805 0.0755 0.084 0.041 0.578
Household Income 20,340 21,526 19,635 20,869 19,812 20,301 0.000 0.013 0.486
1980 Geographic Distribution Across Census Regions      
  
  
  
 
% Northeast 0.3797 0.2116 0.3315 0.4771 0.3889 0.4234 0.000 0.001 0.6063 
% Midwest 0.2183 0.2320 0.3481 0.2255 0.3222 0.2847 0.302 0.004 0.5507 
% South 0.2355 0.3227 0.2155 0.1928 0.1889 0.2044 0.000 0.552 0.7744
% West 0.1665 0.2337 0.1050 0.1046 0.1000 0.0876 0.000 0.989 0.7565
Notes: Columns (1) - (6) report the means of the variables listed in the row headings across the groups of census tracts listed at the top of the columns.  In all of 
these columns, the sample restriction that the census tract must have nonmissing house price data in 1980, 1990, and 2000 is added.  Columns (7)-(9) report the 
p-values from tests that the means in different sets of the subsamples are equal. The Panel title “Neighbor Housing Price” reports the mean housing prices in all 
tracts that share a border with the tract containing the hazardous waste site—the sample sizes differ slightly in this panel (they are 984, 177, 306, 89, and 137, 
respectively) as a few of these tracts are surrounded by water so they don’t share a border with another tract.  All other entries in the table refer to characteristics 
of the tracts where the sites are located (except the column 2 entries which report the means in tracts without a site).  P-values less than .01 are denoted in bold.  
For the air conditioning and bath questions, the numerator is year round housing units and the denominator is all housing units.  For all other variables in the 
“Housing Characteristics” category, the denominator is all housing units.  In contrast to the remainder of the paper, the dollar figures are not adjusted for 
inflation. 
 
 
Table 3: Least Squares Estimates of the Association Between NPL Status and House Prices  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. All NPL Sample, Own Census Tract Observation
1(NPL Status by 2000) 0.040 0.046 0.073 0.067 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
     
R-squared 0.579 0.654 0.731 0.779 
B. All NPL Sample, 3-Mile Radius Circle Sample Obsevation
1(NPL Status by 2000) 0.030 0.059 0.113 0.106 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) 
     
Ho: > 0.045, P-Value 0.076 0.726 0.999 0.999 
R-squared 0.580 0.652 0.727 0.776 
C. Restrict NPL Sites to those in 1982 HRS Sample, Own Census Tract Observation
1(NPL Status by 2000) 0.071 0.076 0.085 0.057 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) 
     
R-squared 0.581 0.655 0.732 0.780 
D. Restrict NPL Sites to those in 1982 HRS Sample, 3-Mile Radius Circle Sample Observation
1(NPL Status by 2000) 0.046 0.145 0.232 0.194 
 (0.015) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
     
Ho: > 0.054, P-Value 0.302 0.999 0.999 0.999 
R-squared 0.580 0.653 0.728 0.777 
     
1980 Prices Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1980 Housing Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes 
1980 Economic and Demographic Variables No No Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects No No No Yes 
Notes: The table reports results from 16 separate regressions.  The sample size is 42,974 in Panels A and B and 
42,321 in Panels C and D.  In Panel A/B (C/D) 985 (332) observations are from an area containing a hazardous 
waste site that had been on the NPL at any time prior to the 2000 observation on housing prices.  The difference 
between A/B and C/D is that C/D drops observations from areas with the 663 NPL sites that were not tested for 
inclusion in the initial NPL.  The remainder of the sample is comprised of the 41,989 observations on census tracts 
with complete housing price data that neither have a NPL site nor are adjacent to a tract with a NPL site.  In Panels 
A/C the NPL unit of observation is the tract that contains the site and in B/D it is based on the census tracts that fall 
within circles centered at the site with a radius of 3 miles.  For these circle-based observations, the dependent and 
independent variables are calculated as weighted means across the tracts inside the circle, where the weight is the 
fraction of the tract’s land area inside the circle multiplied by the tract’s 1980 population.  The entries report the 
coefficient and heteroskedastic-consistent standard error (in parentheses) on the NPL indicator, as well as the R-
squared statistic.  Panels B and D also report p-values from tests of whether the NPL parameters multiplied by the 
1980 aggregate value of the housing stock exceeds $39 million (Panel B) and $42 million (Panel D), which is our 
best estimate of the cost of the average clean-up in these samples.  The aggregate values of the housing stocks in B 
and D are $874 and $796 million, respectively.  The controls are listed in the row headings at the bottom of the 
table.  See the text and Data Appendix for further details. 
Table 4: Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Estimates of the Effect of NPL Status on House Prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A. Own Census Tract
1(NPL Status by 2000) 0.037 0.043 0.056 0.047 0.007 0.027 
 (0.035) (0.031) (0.029) (0.027) (0.063) (0.038) 
       
B. Adjacent Census Tracts
1(NPL Status by 2000) 0.066 0.012 0.011 0.015 -0.006 0.001 
 (0.035) (0.029) (0.025) (0.022) (0.056) (0.035) 
       
C. 2 Mile Radius from Hazardous Waste Sites
1(NPL Status by 2000) 0.018 0.013 0.018 0.003 0.018 -0.008 
 (0.032) (0.029) (0.026) (0.023) (0.053) (0.033) 
       
Ho: > 0.123, P-Value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.000 
D. 3 Mile Radius from Hazardous Waste Sites
1(NPL Status by 2000) 0.056 0.036 0.027 0.001 -0.027 -0.005 
 (0.038) (0.031) (0.026) (0.022) (0.052) (0.034) 
       
Ho: > 0.054, P-Value 0.482 0.282 0.153 0.008 0.058 0.041 
       
1980 Ln House Price Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1980 Housing Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1980 Economic & Demographic Vars No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Quadratic in 1982 HRS Score No No No No Yes No 
Regression Discontinuity Sample No No No No No Yes 
Notes:  The entries report the results from 24 separate instrumental variables regressions.  The ln (2000 median 
house price) is the dependent variable throughout the table.  The units of observation are the census tract that 
contains the site (Panel A), tracts that share a border with the site (Panel B), the areas within a circle of 2 mile radius 
from the site (Panel C), and the areas within a circle of 3 mile radius from the site (Panel D).  In Panels B-D where 
the unit of observation is comprised of multiple census tracts, the dependent and independent variables are 
calculated as weighted means across the relevant census tracts where the weight is the fraction of the tract that fits 
the Panel’s sample selection rule multiplied by the tract’s 1980 population.  The variable of interest is an indicator 
for NPL status and this variable is instrumented with an indicator for whether the tract had a hazardous waste site 
with a 1982 HRS score exceeding 28.5.  The entries are the regression coefficients and heteroskedastic consistent 
standard errors (in parentheses) associated with the NPL indicator.  In Panel A (B-D) the samples sizes are 487 
(483) in columns (1) through (5) and 227 (226) in column (6).  Panels C and D also report p-values from tests of 
whether the NPL parameters multiplied by the 1980 value of total housing exceeds $43 million, which is our best 
estimate of the cost of the average clean-up.  The 1980 aggregate values of the housing stock in the four panels are 
roughly $71, $525, $349, and $796 million (2000 $’s).  See the notes to Table 3, the text and the Data Appendix for 
further details. 
 
Table 5: Further 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of NPL Status on 2000 House Prices, 2-Mile Radius 
Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Add Controls for Ground Water, Surface Water, and Air Migration Pathway Scores
1(NPL Status by 2000) -0.033 -0.021 0.028 0.021 
 (0.050) (0.034) (0.053) (0.061) 
 
B. Add Controls for 2000 Covariates
1(NPL Status by 2000) 0.018 -0.011 -0.046 -0.020 
 (0.032) (0.020) (0.044) (0.031) 
 
C. Dependent Variable is 1990 Housing Prices
1(NPL Status by 1990) 0.019 -0.019 -0.000 -0.040 
 (0.048) (0.033) (0.070) (0.056) 
 
D. Does Effect of NPL Status Differ in Tracts in Top Quartile of Population Density?
1(NPL Status by 2000) 0.048 0.015 0.027 0.006 
 (0.036) (0.027) (0.056) (0.041) 
     
1(2000 NPL)*1(Top Quartile Density) -0.072 -0.043 -0.040 -0.040 
 (0.072) (0.047) (0.047) (0.067) 
     
1980 Ln House Price Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1980 Housing Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes 
1980 Economic and Demographic Variables No Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Quadratic in 1982 HRS Score No No Yes No 
Regression Discontinuity Sample No No No Yes 
Notes:  Each panel reports parameter estimates and standard errors from 4 separate regressions for 2000 housing 
prices.  The panels differ from the Table 4 specifications in the following ways: A. adds controls for the individual 
pathway scores that are used to calculate the HRS score; B. adds controls for the 2000 values of the covariates; C. 
tests for the impact of NPL status on housing prices in 1990; and D. allows the effect of NPL status to differ in 
census tracts in the top quartile of population density.  In all panels, the sample is the 2-mile radius one and the 
sample sizes are 483 in columns (1) through (3) and 226 in column (4).  See the Notes to Table 4 and the text for 
further details. 
Table 6: 2SLS Estimates of Stages of Superfund Clean-ups on Rental Rate Growth, 2-Mile Radius 
Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1(NPL Only) 0.124 -0.019 -0.043 -0.053 
[115 Sites, Mean HRS = 40.2] (0.046) (0.034) (0.049) (0.052) 
     
1(ROD & Incomplete Remediation) 0.101 -0.023 -0.054 -0.083 
[329 Sites, Mean HRS = 44.3] (0.030) (0.022) (0.042) (0.032) 
     
1(Const Complete or NPL Deletion) 0.059 -0.001 -0.028 -0.037 
[214 Sites, Mean HRS = 41.6] (0.032) (0.021) (0.041) (0.032) 
     
P-Value from F-Test of Equality 0.25 0.48 0.36 0.31 
     
1980 Rental Rate Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1980 Housing Characteristics of Rental Units No Yes Yes Yes 
1980 Economic and Demographic Variables No Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Quadratic in 1982 HRS Score No No Yes No 
Regression Discontinuity Sample No No No Yes 
Notes: The entries report the results from 4 separate instrumental variables regressions.  The ln (median rental rate) 
is the dependent variable throughout the table.  There are two observations per county, one for 2000 and one for 
1990.  Here, the indicator variable for NPL status has been replaced by three independent indicator variables.  They 
are equal to 1 for sites that by 1990 or 2000 were placed on the NPL but no ROD had been issued, issued a ROD but 
remediation was incomplete, and “construction complete” or deleted from the NPL, respectively.  The instruments 
are the interactions of the indicator for a 1982 HRS score above 28.5 and these three independent indicators.  The 
table reports the instrumental variables parameter estimates and standard errors clustered at the site level for the 
three indicators of clean-up status.  The table also reports the p-value associated with a F-test that the three 
parameters are equal.  The effect of all of the controls listed in the row headings are allowed to differ in 1990 and 
2000.  The sample sizes in columns (1) through (4) are 966, 960, 960, and 452, respectively.  See the text for further 
details. 
 
Table 7: IV Estimates of 2000 NPL Status on 2000 Demand Shifters, 2-Mile Radius Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Income and Wealth
Household Income     
[1980 Mean: 42,544; 2000 – 1980 Mean: 14,318] 2,758 1,514 -1,233 -563 
 (1,232) (1,289) (3,078) (2,255) 
% Public Assistance     
[1980 Mean: 0.078; 2000 -1980 Mean: 0.000] -0.007 -0.005 0.008 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) 
% College Graduates     
[1980 Mean:0.135; 2000 -1980 Mean: 0.081] 0.002 -0.000 -0.009 -0.010 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.018) (0.013) 
B. Demographics Demand Shifters
% Population Under Age 6     
[1980 Mean: 0.086; 2000 -1980 Mean: -0.018] 0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
% Population Over Age 65     
[1980 Mean: 0.106; 2000 -1980 Mean: 0.019] -0.001 -0.003 -0.014 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) 
% Black     
[1980 Mean: 0.088; 2000 -1980 Mean:0.027] -0.015 -0.015 -0.006 -0.008 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.018) (0.010) 
C. Total Population
Total Population 1,946 355 -2,304 -348 
[1980 Mean: 19,517; 2000 – 1980 Mean: 1,526] (577) (559) (1,613) (876) 
     
1980 Dependent Variable Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Quadratic in 1982 HRS Score No No No No 
Regression Discontinuity Sample  No No Yes Yes 
Notes:  The entries report the results from 28 separate instrumental variables regressions.  The 2000 values 
of the variables underlined in the first column are the dependent variables.  The unit of observation is the 
area within a circle of 2 mile radius from the hazardous waste site.  The dependent and independent 
variables are calculated as weighted means across the census tracts within the 2 mile radius circle, where 
the weight is the fraction of the tract within the circle multiplied by the tract’s 1980 population.  The 
variable of interest is an indicator that equals 1 for observations from tracts with a hazardous waste site that 
was placed on the NPL by 2000 and this variable is instrumented with an indicator for whether the tract had 
a hazardous waste site with a 1982 HRS score exceeding 28.5.  The entries are the regression coefficients 
and heteroskedastic consistent standard errors (in parentheses) associated with the NPL indicator.  The 
samples sizes are 483 in columns (1) through (3) and 226 in column (4).  The 1980 and 2000-1980 means 
of the dependent variables are reported in square brackets.  See the text and previous tables for further 
details.   
Table 8: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of 2000 NPL Status on Housing Supply, 2- and 3- Mile Radius 
Samples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total Housing Units
2 Mile Radius from Hazardous Waste Sites
[1980 Mean: 7,363; 2000 – 1980 Mean: 1,013] 344 60 -889 -260 
 (151) (151) (369) (202) 
     
3 Mile Radius from Hazardous Waste Sites
[1980 Mean: 16,431; 2000- 1980 Mean: 2,187] 1,094 309 -907 -56 
 (330) (286) (702) (373) 
     
1980 Dependent Variable and Ln House Price Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1980 Housing Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes 
1980 Economic and Demographic Variables No Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Quadratic in 1982 HRS Score No No Yes No 
Regression Discontinuity Sample No No No Yes 
Notes:  The entries report the results from 8 separate instrumental variables regressions.  The dependent variables 
are the number of housing units.  The results are reported for the cases where the units of observation are the areas 
within a circle of 2 and 3 mile radius from the site.  The dependent and independent variables are calculated as 
weighted means across the relevant census tracts where the weight is the fraction of the tract that falls within the 
circle multiplied by the tract’s 1980 population.  The variable of interest is an indicator for NPL status and this 
variable is instrumented with an indicator for whether the tract had a hazardous waste site with a 1982 HRS score 
exceeding 28.5.  The entries are the regression coefficients and heteroskedastic consistent standard errors (in 
parentheses) associated with the NPL indicator.  The samples sizes are 483 in columns (1) through (3) and 226 in 
column (4).  The means of the dependent variable in 1980 and the mean change between 2000 and 1980 are reported 
in square brackets in the first column.  See the notes to Table 3, the text and the Data Appendix for further details. 
Figure 1a: Bid Curves, Offer Curves, and the Equilibrium Hedonic Price Schedule in a Hedonic Market 
for Local Environmental Quality 
Consumer #1
Consumer #2
Consumer #3
Supplier #1
Supplier #2
Supplier #3
p1
p2
p3
Price
of 
Land
l Environmental
Hedonic Price Schedule
cj1 LocaQuality
cj2 cj3
 
Figure 1b: Welfare Gains Due to Amenity Improvements with Two Supply Curves 
S1
S2
D2
D1
A1
B1
Price
Quantity of Land for 
Residential Housing
B2
A2
Q2Q1
P1
P2
 
Figure 2: Geographic Distribution of NPL Hazardous Waste Sites in the All NPL Sample 
 
 
  
 
Notes: The All NPL sample is comprised of the 985 hazardous waste sites assigned to the NPL by January 1, 2000 that we placed in a census tract 
with nonmissing housing price data in 1980, 1990, and 2000. 
 
Notes: The 1982 HRS Sample is comprised of the 487 hazardous waste sites that were placed in a census 
tract with nonmissing housing price data in 1980, 1990, and 2000.  306 (181) of these sites had 1982 HRS 
scores above (below) 28.5.
Figure 3: Geographic Distribution of Hazardous Waste Sites in the 1982 HRS Sample 
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B. Sites with 1982 HRS Scores Below 28.5 
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Notes: The figure displays the distribution of 1982 HRS scores among the 487 hazardous waste sites that were tested for placement on the NPL 
after the passage of the Superfund legislation but before the announcement of the first NPL in 1983.  The 188 sites with missing housing data in 
1980, 1990, or 2000 are not included in the subsequent analysis and hence are excluded from this figure.  The vertical line at 28.5 represents the 
cut-off that determined eligibility for placement on the NPL. 
Figure 4: Distribution of 1982 HRS Scores 
Figure 5: Probability of Placement on the NPL by 1982 HRS Score 
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Notes: The figure plots the bivariate relation between the probability of 2000 NPL status and the 1982 
HRS score among the 487 sites in the 1982 HRS sample.  These plots are done separately for sites below 
(dark colored line) and above (light colored line) the 28.5 threshold.  They come from the estimation of 
nonparametric regressions that use Cleveland’s (1979) tricube weighting function and a bandwidth of 0.5.  
The data points present the mean probabilities in the same 4-unit intervals of the HRS score as in Figure 
4.  See the text for further details. 
Figure 6: 2000 Residual House Prices after Adjustment for Column 4 Covariates, 2-Mile Radius Sample  
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Notes: The figure plots the results from nonparametric regressions between 2000 residual housing prices 
from the 2 mile radius sample after adjustment for the covariates in the column (4) specification of Table 
4 (except the indicator for a HRS score above 28.5) and the 1982 HRS scores.  The nonparametric 
regressions use Cleveland’s (1979) tricube weighting function and a bandwidth of 0.5.  These plots are 
done separately for sites below (dark colored line) and above (light colored line) the 28.5 regulatory 
threshold.  The data points are based on the same 4-unit intervals of the HRS score as in Figures 4 and 5.  
See the text for further details. 
Figure 7: 2000 Residual Housing Units after Adjustment for Column 4 Covariates, 2-Mile Radius Sample 
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Notes: The figure plots the results from nonparametric regressions between 2000 residual housing units 
from the 2 mile radius sample after adjustment for the covariates in the column (2) specification of Table 
8 (except the indicator for a HRS score above 28.5) and the 1982 HRS scores.  The nonparametric 
regressions use Cleveland’s (1979) tricube weighting function and a bandwidth of 0.5.  These plots are 
done separately for sites below (dark colored line) and above (light colored line) the 28.5 regulatory 
threshold.  The data points are based on the same 4-unit intervals of the HRS score as in Figures 4-6.  See 
the text for further details. 
 
